On the ipth the bombardment of the enemy reopened at dawn, the " Requin " and the two monitors now joining in the battle. At 7:15 A.M. the 53rd Div. launched its attack along the coast. A quarter of an hour later the 52nd and 54th attacked the former astride the ridge running S.W. from 'Ali Muntar, the latter, with the addition of the Imperial Camel Bde., immediately on the right of the 52nd. Farther to the right again the Impe- rial Mounted Div. made a dismounted attack on Atawine, while the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Div. protected the extreme right flank, and prepared to take advantage of any suc- cess gained by the Imperial Mounted Div. The 74th Div. was ttn reserve W. of Sheikh 'Abbas.
The 52nd Div. was the first to be checked, after progressing about half-way to its objective at 'Ali Muntar. This resulted in checking also the progress of the 53rd Div. on its left, and the left of the 54th Div. on its right. The right of the 54th Div., however, entered the enerny's works at Khirbet Sihan, just W. of the Atawine ridge, while the containing attack of the Imperial Mounted Div. was successful in occupying the defend- ers of the Atawine works. But the situation of the 54th Div. was far from favourable. Owing to the continued inability of the 53rd to make headway its left was exposed to heavy enfilade fire from 'Ali Muntar, while its right, with the Camel Bde. thrust far forward, was subjected to a series of determined counter- attacks. In this position, reached in the early afternoon, the battle swayed with little change for the rest of the day. Air reconnaissance indicated that the enemy's reserves had not yet been drawn in, and Gen. Dobell, though moving part of the 74th Div. closer up, would not be the first to launch his last reserve, especially in view of the fact that it was the 52nd Div. which was checked and that the reserve brigade of that division had not yet been employed.
Towards evening Gen. Dobell reported the situation to advanced G.H.Q., when Sir Archibald Murray instructed him by telephone that all ground gained must without fail be held and the attack resumed under cover of an intense artillery bombardment at dawn on the 2oth. General Dobell issued his orders accordingly, and as night fell every preparation for the pursuance of the offensive was actively in hand. Between 10 and 1 1 o'clock at night, however, Gen. Dobell was in communi- cation with the Desert Column and all his divisional command- ers, who by this time had received more detailed and accurate reports of the situation on their respective fronts. These reports made it clear that the enemy's resistance nowhere as yet showed any signs of weakening, that the British casualties amounted to some 7,000, and that the prospects of being able to make any considerable further progress without a much longer, more intense, and less hurriedly planned artillery prep- aration, were, to say the least, dubious. By i A.M. the new artillery plan, including the divisional arrangements, was ready. General Dobell was not satisfied that in the time, and with the means available, the prospects of success were sufficient to warrant the immediate resumption of the action. Telephonic communication with divisional commanders and their artillery chiefs more than confirmed his doubts. General Chetwode, commanding the Desert Column, was equally clearly of opinion that the prospects were not sufficiently favourable to justify a hurried resumption of the attack. About 4 o'clock in the morning, therefore, Gen. Dobell issued orders to postpone further operations, with Sir Archibald Murray's assent.
The ground gained was consolidated during April 20 and following days. The enemy made no serious counter-attacks. It became clear that, before Gaza, there was nothing for it but the deliberate methods of trench warfare. The alternative involved long preparation, new communications, and an eventual movement far away in the direction of the British right flank. On April 22 Sir Archibald reported to the War Office that with his present force he could not count on more than a local suc- cess; and here the Sinai campaign proper came to an end.
There was no further considerable action during the spring or summer. The opposing lines stabilized, and there ensued a period of preparation and training, of trench-raiding, and of enterprises
by mounted troops and camelry in the direction of Beersheba, and against the railway running S. from that place which was demolished. But the Sinai desert had been conquered and passed. The defence of Egypt was secure. And room had been gained for the preparation of a great offensive campaign in the autumn. Thus the mission assigned to Sir Archibald Murray at the begin- ning of the year had been fulfilled. Meanwhile, at the head- quarters of the Eastern Force, where Lt.-Gen. Sir Philip Chet- wode had now succeeded Sir Charles Dobell, the plans were already in course of preparation which were to become the basis of the great campaign fought in the autumn by Gen. Sir Edmund Allenby, who succeeded Sir Archibald Murray in the Egyptian command in June. (G. P. D.)
(IV.) THE PALESTINE CAMPAIGN
The successful defence of Gaza on April 19 1917, when Gen. Kress von Kressenstein for the second time in little more than three weeks had beaten off formidable British attacks, was fol- lowed by a prolonged pause while both armies went into " sum- mer quarters." Every effort was made on both sides for a re- sumption of the struggle in the autumn, and by the beginning of Aug. 1917 the German staff, realizing that the next British effort was likely to be considerably more formidable than the last, represented to Constantinople that the Gaza-Beersheba line was inherently weak in that its left flank was " in the air," and that the only remedies were either readjustment, involving withdrawal, or reinforcement on a generous scale.
Unhappily for the Ottoman cause political ambitions came into conflict with military necessities. The loss of Bagdad on March n 1917 had been a blow to the prestige of the Sultan, more severe in that it followed upon that of Mecca, and the Pan-Islamic party in the capital was insistent that steps should be taken to retrieve the loss and rehabilitate the Ottoman Khalifates in the eyes of the Moslem world by a triumphant recovery of the city of the Khalifs. In this contention the Pan- Islamic leaders were supported by Berlin, where the influence of alliterative war cries indicative of future trade domination was strong. " Berlin to Bagdad " still reigned in official and public esteem, not yet supplanted by " Hamburg to Herat."
In consequence of this political counter-attraction Constanti- nople sent men and supplies for the reconquest of Iraq (Mesopo- tamia), until it was persuaded to realize that the Palestine front, if starved of needed reinforcements, would inevitably give way in a debdcle which might permit an active enemy to advance up the whole length of Syria and establish himself on the Upper Euphrates, thus cutting off the whole of the force in Meso- potamia from communication with Constantinople except by way of the railless and mountainous Armenia and Kurdistan. The Pan-Islamists fought hard for their policy and succeeded in delaying the dispatch of troops to Palestine until the middle of October. It was then too late, but this was not realized.
As soon as Constantinople had accepted the principle that the presence of a powerful British striking force in front of Gaza constituted a menace to the operations destined for the recovery of Bagdad, Marshal von Falkenhayn, in command of the Yilderim Army Group, then at Aleppo, was directed to drive the British back into the Desert of Sinai. The marshal planned to strike at the British right flank, which, it was thought, had probably been weakened in order to mass troops upon the left for the expected third assault on Gaza. It was proposed to start this Turkish offensive about the middle of Oct., which would forestall the British offensive, calculated by the German staff to be due in the first week of November.
Serious difficulties, however, arose which fatally delayed the completion of these dispositions. In the first place the Turkish transport was poor. The sector of the Turkish lines of commu- nication from Bozanti, the then railhead from Constantinople or, rather, Haidar Pasha on the Asiatic shore of the Bosporus, to Beersheba, was under the Syrian Western Arabia command of which Ahmad Jemal Pasha was G.O.C.: unfortunately this politician was jealous because the command of the Yilderim Group, which since the beginning of July 1917 had included his
