own case, is void in itself, for jura naturae sunt immobilia, and leges legum." And Lord Blackburn, speaking for all the attending Judges, again says: "It is contrary to the general rule of law, not only in this country, but in every other, to make a man a judge in his own case."
Perhaps the most important of these "discovered" laws is that those appointed, or forced by law to exercise judgment, or a use of discretion, must be protected from the consequences of the risks of the errors necessarily involved.
This law was naturally among the earliest to be "discovered," and its violation as naturally and reasonably involves the greatest degree of resentment and distress. It is in the writer's opinion the most important in the whole discussion. It, therefore, becomes of prime importance clearly to ascertain its reason, because, as Lord Coke, so long ago and so well said:[1] "The law is unknown to him that knoweth not the reason thereof, and that the known certainty of the law is the safety of all"; and also because the law consists not in particular instances and precedents, but in the reason of the law."[2]
From the earliest time, and in all civilized nations, the higher Judiciary have always given themselves complete immunity from their errors in judging. Constantly having to use judgment, they inevitably at once ascertained the impossibility of satisfactorily performing this higher function in an atmosphere of constant annoyance, anxiety and fear; and it was for the public benefit—not from timidity or favor to themselves—that they declared this never departed-from exemption. But since "reason is the life of the law," and its prin-
