it is for the court to determine whether the contract be a fair and reasonable one or not; and the test appears to be, whether it be prejudicial or not to the public interest; for it is on grounds of public policy alone that these contracts are supported or avoided. * * * It is justly observed by Lord Wynford that the effect of those contracts" (those allowed) "is to encourage rather than cramp the employment of capital in trade, and the promotion of industry." And, finally, Lord Macnaghten, speaking in the House of Lords and so settling the law of England, says in Nordenfelt vs. Maxim:[1] "The public have an interest in every person carrying on his trade freely; so has the individual. All interference with individual liberty of action, in trading, and all restraints of trade of themselves, if there is nothing more, are contrary to public policy, and, therefore, void. That is the general rule. But, there are exceptions. * * * It is a sufficient justification and, indeed, it is the only justification, if the restriction is reasonable—reasonable, that is, in reference to the interests of the parties concerned, and reasonable in reference to the interests of the public—so framed and so guarded as to afford adequate protection to the party in whose interest it is imposed, while, at the same time, it is in no way injurious to the public." Finally, in the Addyston case:[2] "The inhibition against restraints of trade at common law seems, at first, to have had no exceptions. * * * After a time it became apparent to the people and the courts that it was in the interest of trade that certain covenants in restraint should be enforced. It was of importance, as an incentive to industry and honest dealing in trade."
- ↑ 1894 A. C 559 (1894).
- ↑ 85 Fed. 280 (1898), 175 U S 211 (1899).
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