tion was for an unlawful purpose and is a conspiracy within the statute."
And so it was also determined in the Addyston case:[1] "Another aspect of this contract of association brings it within the term used in the statute, 'a conspiracy in restraint of trade.' * * * One of the means adopted by the defendants * * * was * * * illegal and fraudulent. * * * No matter what the excuse for the combination by defendants in restraint of trade, the illegality of the means stamps it as a conspiracy, and so brings it within that term of the Federal statute."[2]
It results that, while it has for manifest reasons been necessary to carefully scrutinize intent and tendency when all that has been done was to exercise a lawful power in lawful manner, and thus to exclude "tendency" from the mere possession of such power unaccompanied by temptation or proved intent to misuse, there is no such reason in the case of wrongdoers, that they may be left free to exploit the public. Where illegal conduct is thought necessary, innocence of ultimate purpose need not and is not assumed; nor does public policy require that the State should run any risk of the possibility being converted into accomplished injury. Everything is to be presumed against such wrong-doers; and full precaution is justifiable that the public may not suffer. While the probabilities of lawful conduct may be confined to beneficial results, the probability of crime is injury. For crime is not resorted to where "legitimate means and lawful methods" will suffice. In any event, no public policy can require the taking of any chances in favor of such wrong-doers.
- ↑ 85 F. 293 (1898).
- ↑ Affirmed, 175 U. S. 211 (1899).
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