But when so much is said, I feel that it will be ultimately decided that competition has thus served its full purpose; that properly used coöperation is not precluded, nor man's best friend exiled.
If it be asked, "What test must be applied to determine where coöperation may begin and competition be limited?" the answer seems clear.
Prima facie, a stifling of competition on a great scale or in unusual ways imperatively needs explanation; and the one explanation that can be safely accepted is that the greater good, "coöperation," is substituted for it; but substituted "to make," not merely "to take;" to benefit, not injure; to increase production and trade, not to limit either; to profit by more largely supplying, not denying! If that be proved, and so long as it continue, "tendency" is not present, and lawfulness continues, too! That was thought to be the Knight case!
No matter how general the language of the cases, their admitted exceptions are without intelligible explanation if this be not what the courts really mean, the underlying doctrine!
But it again only brings us back to the common law—"the exception is in furtherance of the rule."
And so we are again at our starting place. The court regards substance, not form or nomenclature. That which advances trade, plenty, happiness, is legal; that which limits or tends to limit, unlawful.
"The public have an interest in every one carrying on his trade freely; so has the individual. All interference with individual liberty of action in trading, and all restraints of trade, of themselves, if there is nothing more, are contrary to public policy and therefore void. That is the general rule. But
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