the former Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London will remember—that the Habsburg Monarchy was about to commit suicide. It was evident to those practically acquainted with Austro-Hungarian affairs that, whether Austria-Hungary were left to crush Serbia without interference from the Great Powers, or whether the conflict were to grow into a European conflagration, the real independence of the Habsburgs would be a thing of the past. They could not overrun and annex Serbia without incurring such obligations towards Germany as to render them, more than ever, German vassals. In the event of a European conflagration they could only hope for victory through German support, and victory would render them a mere link in the Pan-German chain of States stretching from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf. In the event of defeat in a European war, they could not hope to resist the aspirations of their peoples for liberation, or, indeed, the demands of the victors for political guarantees against the recurrence of so foul a conspiracy against the tranquillity and equilibrium of Europe.
The course of the war and the political developments by which it has been accompanied in Central Europe have justified this estimate; but they have also shown that there may exist a fourth contingency from which the Habsburgs might hope to profit. It is with this contingency that the Allies are now confronted. Should Austria-Hungary, and her open and occult partisans, succeed in persuading the Allied Governments
