reign-title Yung-chêng 雍正. He was the fourth son of Emperor Shêng-tsu. His mother, Empress Hsiao-kung [q. v.], was a maid-servant in the Palace, but a year after he was born she was elevated to an imperial consort of the fourth rank. In 1698 he was made a prince of the third rank, and in 1709 was raised to the first rank with the designation, Yung (雍親王). As a prince, he lived quietly at home, and became well-versed in Chinese and in Buddhistic literature. But when his brother, the Heir Apparent Yin-jêng [q. v.], twice showed signs of mental unbalance (1708 and 1712) and lost the favor of Emperor Shêng-tsu, and when the other princes organized factions to contend for his place, Yin-chên determined to obtain the throne for himself. Since he achieved his aim and so was able to re-write the official records at will, little is known of his activities in the struggle for primacy during the last twenty years of his father's reign. But it is clear that, as a prince, he took pains to cultivate the friendship of such able courtiers as Lungkodo and Nien Kêng-yao [qq. v.] and of those Bannermen in the companies assigned to him as his retainers. Judging from the irreconcilable attitude of his contending brothers, and from the harsh measures he used against them, it is clear that their hatred of him was deep-rooted and was aggravated by numerous unrecorded incidents which made reconciliation impossible. Yet it is likely that if any of his opponents had become Emperor, Yin-chên would have suffered similarly at his hands (see under Yin-ssŭ).
In the second decade of the eighteenth century Yin-t'i [禵 q.v.], fourteenth son of Emperor Shêng-tsu and a brother of Yin-chên by the same mother, was favored by the aged Emperor as Heir Apparent. In 1718 he was made commander-in-chief of the armies sent to the northwest to guard against invasion by the Eleuths and the Tanguts. Aware of his father's favor, Yin-t'i, though far away in Kansu, kept in constant communication with his supporters, being evidently eager for information about the situation at the capital.
However, late in 1722, Emperor Shêng-tsu suddenly took ill and was kept in bed at his country villa, the Ch'ang-ch'un yüan (see under Hsüan-yeh). On December 16 Yin-chên was sent to the Temple of Heaven to prepare himself ceremonially to represent the Emperor at the Winter Solistice Sacrifices which normally ended on December 22. But instead of completing these ceremonies, he was at the side of the Emperor when he died on December 20. According to the officially-prepared accounts, the Emperor declared to several of his sons and courtiers, before his death, that Yin-chên should be his successor. Unofficial chroniclers aver, however, that it was Yin-t'i and not Yin-chên who was designated successor to the throne, and that the will was altered by Lungkodo. Recent studies in documents of the period seem to corroborate some of these assertions, all the more so because of discrepancies in Yin-chên's own edicts relating to the last days of his father. Some of the unofficial accounts actually assert that Yin-chên murdered his father in order to take the other aspirants by surprise. However that may be, as soon as Emperor Shêng-tsu died Lungkodo, as commandant of the Peking Gendarmerie, kept the city under control. Yin-chên, escorting his father's remains and guarded by soldiers with drawn swords, entered the city and was recognized as Emperor, without disturbance. Yin-t'i, the most powerful other aspirant, could not retaliate, since he was far away and under the surveillance of the two generals, Nien Kêng-yao and Yen-hsin [q. v.] who favored his opponent.
During the first years of his reign, Yin-chên strenuously consolidated his power by putting his brothers under the surveillance of his friends and by appointing his own supporters to key positions. Some opponents he eliminated by imprisonment or execution (see under Yin-ssŭ); he severely punished those who criticized him (see under Cha Ssŭ-t'ing); and even did away with some former supporters, perhaps to prevent the disclosure of secrets. Throughout his reign he was busy suppressing any intimations by his opponents that he may have usurped the throne (see under Tsêng Ching).
Of great significance to the dynasty was his policy of depriving the princes of their power to control the Bannermen who were allotted to them as retainers. When the Eight Banners were established (see under Nurhaci) only one belonged to the Emperor; in theory, at least, the seven princes who each controlled a Banner had absolute power over the men in that Banner. But by 1651 three Banners had reverted to the control of the throne (see under Abahai, Dorgon and Fu-lin) with the result that the power of some princes was considerably curtailed. There were princes, however, who still held absolute power over their retainers; and, as the new Emperor was keenly aware, they could exercise it for their own advantage—as he had once done.
916
