444 HANNIBAL corn had risen to an almost famine price. The country round must have been woefully wasted, and multitudes reduced to beggary. One thing indeed the Romans had had to console them during these trying years. The Latin communities in Etruria and Latium had stood by them with wonderful fidelity. This had been their salvation. Bat now in the years 209 and 208 B.C. came signs of discontent and wavsring. Of the Latin colonies several dsclared that they could no longer furnish contingents or contributions. There were rumours too of a disloyal move- meat in Etruria. But, worst of all, there came news in the autumn of 208 B.C. that Hasdrubal had crossed the Pyrenees. By next summer he would have passed the Alps. Should the two brothers unite their forces, Rome s fate, it could hardly bs doubted, would be sealed. She was now in far greater jeopardy than she was even after the disastrous day of Cannae. The year 207 was thus a very anxious one. Claudius Nero and Marcus Livius were the consuls. The first was to watch Hannibal in Apulia, the other was to encounter Hasdrubal in Cisalpine Gaul. Livius retreated before the new invader, and let him reach Sena in Urnbria, to the south of the river Metaurus, without opposition. Thence Hasdrubal sent despatches to his brother, who was at Cmusium in Apulia. The plan was that they should join their armies at Narnia on the Flaminian road, between 50 and 60 miles from Rome. Unluckily for the two brothers the despatches fell into the hands of Nero. His resolution was formed in a moment. Leaving the bulk of his army in its camp, he hurried northwards with 7000 of his best troops, and after a rapid march of 200 miles he joined Livius. The two generals forced Hasdrubal to a battle. The Carthaginian was utterly defeated, and he was him self slain. Nero returned with all speed to his army, and informed Hannibal of the defeat and death of his brother by having the head of Hasdrubal flung into his camp. With that sight all hope must have died in Hannibal s heart. The battle of the Metaurus was indeed one of the decisive battles of the worll. It decided the Second Punic War. From that time, for four more years, Hannibal could but stand on the defensive in the southernmost corner of the Italian peninsula. But evsn to the last no Roman general dared to close with him. Never in a single battle, as Polybius says, was he beaten while in Italy. Before quitting the country, he left a memorial of his wonderful achievements. In the tsmple of Juno on the Lacinian promontory, near Crotona, he inscribed on brazen tablets in Punic and in Greek an account of his expedition and his campaigns. Polybius saw the inscription and doubtless availed himself of it for his history. For fifteen years Hannibal had maintained himself in Italy, ravaging it from end to end, and inflicting on the Romans according to their own calculation a total loss of 300,000 men. Now all was clearly over. After Nero s victory the Romans could afford to wait the course of events. Scipio had been victorious in Spain, and early in 204 B.C. he was allowed to cross into Africa. Soon it was clear that he would threaten Carthage more effectively than Hannibal had ever threatened Rome. He received the order of recall at Crotona, and thence embarked for Africa. He landed at the smaller Leptis, on the coast of Tunis, late in the year 203 B.C., and lingered during the winter at Hadrumetum, the modern Susa. His brothers Hasdrubal and Mago had both fallen, and he was now the last of the " lion s brood." Fugitive as he was, his presence roused the Carthaginian spirit. The people would not hear of peace. Hannibal indeed attempted to negoti ate, and had an interview with Scipio, but in vain. When ha saw that he must fight, he could not have felt any of his old confidence. He had some good troops, but he was numerically inferior to the enemy. Of his veterans but few could have remained. The armies at last met at Zama, somewhere near the modern Keff. The battle was obstinately contested, and Hannibal s old soldiers died fighting in their ranks. But he never really had a chance of victory. Many of his men were raw mercenaries, and some of them deserted to the enemy. His army was utterly dis comfited, and indeed annihilated. The defeat was .not dis creditable to him, but it was decisive. With a handful of men he escaped to Hadrumetum, and in the year 202 B.C. the Second Punic or, more properly, the Hannibalian War was at an end. He was still only in his forty-sixth year. He soon showed that he could be a statesman as well as a soldier. Peace having been concluded, he was appointed chief magistrate of the stats. The office had become rather insignificant, but Hannibal restored its power and authority. The oligarchy, always jealous of him, had even charged him with having betrayed the interests of his country while in Italy, and neglected to take Rome when he might have done so. The dishonesty and incompetence of these men had brought the finances of Carthage into grievous disorder. So effectively did Hannibal reform abuses that the heavy tribute imposed by Rome could be paid by instalments without additional and extraordinary taxation. Carthage grew prosperous, and again the Romans trembled. Seven years after the victory of Zama they demanded Hannibal s surrender. They were still in mortal dread of their old enemy. Hannibal did not wish his countrymen to disgrace themselves, and he therefore at once became an exile. First he went to Tyre, the mother-city of Carthage, and thence bo Ephesus, where he was honourably received by Antiochus, king of Syria, who was then preparing for war with Rome. Hannibal soon saw that the king s army was no match for the Romans. He advised him to equip a fleet and throw a body of troops on the south of Ital} r , adding that he would himself take the command. But he could not make much impression on Antiochus, who was a conceited man, quite ignorant of the strength of Rome. The story was told that, pointing to the great army he had assembled at Ephesus, be asked Hannibal if he did not think that these were enough for the Romans. Hannibal s reply was, " Yes, enough for the Romans, however greedy they may be." The great army in which Antiochus had trusted was in 190 B.C. routed by Scipio at Magnesia near Smyrna. Again Rome demanded the surrender of Hannibal. The end was now at hand. From the court of Antiochus Hannibal fled to Crete, but he soon went back to Asia, and sought refuge with Prusias, king of Bithynia. Once more the Romans were determined to hunt out the old man, and they sent Flamininus to insist on his surrender. Prusias was but a poor paltry princeling, and he promptly complied. Hannibal did not choose to fall into his enemies hands. At Libyssa, on the eastern shore of the Sea of Marmcra, he took poison, which, it was said, he had long carried about with him in a ring. The precise year of his death was a matter of controversy. If, as Livy seems to imply, it was 183 B.C., he died in the same year as his great and victorious antagonist, Scipio Africanus. As to the transcendent military genius of Hannibal there cannot be two opinions. The man who for fifteen years could hold his ground in a hostile country against several powerful armies and a succession of able generals must have been a commander and a tactician of supreme capacity. Wonderful as his achievements were, we must marvel the more when we take into account the grudging support he received from Carthage. As his veterans melted away, he had to organize fresh levies on the spot. We never hear of a mutiny in his army, composed though it was of
Africans, Spaniards, and Gauls. He who could throw a spell