and may be proved by external evidence. But the deism of the 17th century is a phase of thought that has no living reality now, and the whole aspect of the religious problem has been completely changed. To a generation that has been moulded by the philosophy of Kant and Hegel, and by the historical criticism of Strauss and the later German theology, the argument of the Analogy cannot but appear to lie quite outside the field of controversy. To Butler the Christian religion, and by that he meant the orthodox Church of England system, was a moral scheme revealed by a special act of the divine providence, the truth of which was to be judged by the ordinary canons of evidence. The whole stood or fell on historical grounds. A speculative construction of religion was a thing abhorrent to him, a thing of which he seems to have thought the human mind naturally incapable. The religious consciousness does not receive from him the slightest consideration, whereas it is with its nature and functions that the scientific theology of the present time is almost entirely occupied. The Analogy, it would appear, has and can have but little influence on the present state of theology ; it was not a book for all time, but was limited to the controversies
and questions of the period at Avhich it appeared.Throughout the whole of the Analogy, it is manifest that the interest which lay closest to Butler s heart was the ethical. His whole cast of thinking was practical. The moral nature of man, his conduct in life, is that on account of which alone an inquiry into religion is of importance. The systematic account of this moral nature is to be found in the famous Sermons preached at the Chapel of the Rolls, especially in the first three. In these sermons Butler has made substantial contributions to ethical science, and it may be said with confidence, that in their own department nothing superior in value appeared during the long interval between Aristotle and Kant. To both of these great thinkers he has certain analogies. He resembles the first in his method of investigating the end which human nature is intended to realize ; he reminds of the other by the con sistency with which he upholds the absolute supremacy of moral law.
In his ethics, as in his theology, Butler had constantly in view a certain class of adversaries, consisting partly of the philosophic few, partly of the fashionably-educated many, who all participated in one common mode of thinking. The key-note of this tendency had been struck by Hobbes, in whose philosophy man was regarded as a mere sensitive machine, moved solely by pleasures and pains. Human nature had come to be looked upon as essentially selfish ; disinterested actions were sneered at as impossibilities by the many, and were explained away into modifications of selfishness by the scientific moralists. Cudworth and Clarke, it is true, had tried to place ethios on a nobler footing, but their speculations had been of the abstract kind, which was always distasteful to Butler. They were not practical enough, were not sufficiently " applicable to the several particular relations and circumstances of life." He desired to base ethical law not on abstract theory, but on the actual facts of human nature.
The fundamental view of things from which he starts in his inquiry may be called the teleological. " Every work, both of nature and art, is a system ; and as every particular thing both natural and artificial is for some use or purpose out of or beyond itself, one may add to what has been already brought into the idea of a system its conduciveness to this one or more ends." Ultimately this view of nature, as the sphere of the realization of final causes, rests on a theological basis ; but Butler does not introduce prominently into his ethics the specifically theological groundwork, and may be thought willing to ground his principle on ex perience. The ethical Question then is, as with Aristotle, what is the re Xos of man 1 He is placed in the world with many courses of action open to him, What is that line of activity which is correspondent to, or is the realization of, his true nature 1 The answer to this question is to be obtained by an analysis of the facts of human nature, whence, Butler thinks, " it will as fully appear that this our nature, i.e., constitution, is adapted to virtue, as from the idea of a watch it appeaxs that its nature, i.e., con stitution or system, is adapted to measure time." Such analysis had been .already attempted by Hobbes, and the result he came to was that man naturally is adapted only for a life of selfishness, his end is the procuring of plea sure and the avoidance of pain. A closer examination, however, shows that this at least is false. The truth of the counter propositions, that man is </>uVe<, TroAm/cos, natu rally social, and that the full development of his being is impossible apart from society, becomes manifest on the slightest examination of the facts. For while self-love plays a most important part in the human economy, there is no less evidently a natural principle of benevolence, prompting actions which have for their end the good of others. Moreover, among the particular passions, appetites, and desires there are some whose tendency is as clearly towards the general good as that of others is towards our own satisfaction. Finally, that principle in man which reflects upon actions and the springs of actions, which approves some and disapproves others, unmistakably sets the stamp of its approbation upon conduct that tends towards the general good. It is clear, therefore, that we were made for society ; man is wov TroAmKov, and from this point of view the sum of practical morals might be given in Butler s own words, " that mankind is a com munity, that we all stand in a relation to each other, that there is a public end and interest of society, which each particular is obliged to promote." But deeper questions remain.
The threefold division into passions and affections, self- love and benevolence, and conscience, is Butler s celebrated analysis of human nature. In the handling of the several parts he shows remarkable psychological power, and succeeds in obviating many of the difficulties drawn from the principles of the selfish theory of ethics. He is especially concerned to show that self-love and benevolence are in no sense opposed to one another. This he does by examining the function of self-love and the relation it bears to the passions. The special desires or affections are the expressions of wants in our nature which are to be satisfied by the possession of definite things. The objects of the desires are therefore the things naturally adapted to satisfy them, and not the pleasure which is the ac companiment of satisfaction. The passions tend towards their objects as ultimate ends, and are consequently unselfish or disinterested. On the other hand, self-love aims at procuring happiness for the individual ; and happiness means the general satisfaction of desires. Self- love is therefore distinct from the particular desires, but is completely dependent on them. Its end is the attainment of pleasure, and it desires external things only as means towards this. In itself it has no actual content ; it only directs the particular passions towards their ends, and frequently, by fixing its attention too much upon its own goal, personal happiness, is in danger of defeating its own endeavours. Self-love is therefore distinct from and in no way opposed to the particular affections which are them selves disinterested. Just as little opposition is there between self-love and disinterested benevolence. An affection which finds its gratification in some external object and rests in it as a final end, is in no sense opposed to self-love. This is one of the most important parts of Butler s ethical psychology.
