was so much dissatisfied with the result of the campaign, that he made great preparations for renewing the attack in 54 B.C. On this occasion he penetrated further into the interior and crossed the Thames, but Cassivellaunus, to whom the defence of his country had been entrusted, followed the Roman army with his war chariots, and successfully impeded their operations. Caesar, before he left, imposed a tribute and demanded hostages, but it was difficult to conceal that he retired discomfited from a land which he had to all appearance seriously intended to subdue. The next two years witnessed the final struggle of the Gauls to regain their freedom. Inspirited by the resistance of the Germans and the Britons, and inflamed by the death of Dumnorix, they determined to make a simultaneous attack on the llomau garrisons, which this winter were scattered more widely than usiial. ty. Titurius Sabinus and L. Aurelius Gotta were the first assailed. Deceived by Ambiorix, king of the Eburones, their whole division was annihilated. A similar attack was made upon Q. Cicero in the territory of the Nervii, but Cassar was near enough to bring assistance. The insurrection was checked and a terrible vengeance exacted from the Eburones. Acco, prince of the Carnutes, was executed by the victors. His death spurred his tribesmen to greater exertions. In the winter of 53-52 B.C. they roused the spirit of their countrymen. The post of honour was held by the Arverni, under their prince Vercingetorix, an heroic leader, whose name casts lustre on this last vigorous but hopeless struggle. A new plan of defence was adopted. Instead of defending every town against the Romans, it was determined to burn those places which could not be held, and to concentrate their forces in those strong positions which gave a good hope of success. Thus the campaign clusters round the names of Avaricum, Gergovia, and Alesia. The first of these towns (Bourges) was taken in the spring of 52 B.C. The second, the capital of the Arverni, was attacked by Caesar in vain, and an attempt to remedy the disaster led to a more decisive defeat. The star of Caesar began to pale. The Hix?dui, who had before hesitated to join the insurrec tion, now avowed their hostility, and the whole nation rose like one man to cast off the yoke of the invader. The final struggle was concentrated round the hill-town of Alesia. Vercingetorix, faithful to his tactics, took refuge here with 80,000 infantry and 25,000 horse. Caesar had been able to join his forces with Labienus, and invested the hill on every side. The mighty masses of the Gallic landsturm crowded from all quarters to release their champion. Caesar was at once besieger and besieged. In this supreme crisis his genius triumphed. The provisions of Alesia were exhausted. Caesar repulsed the double attack on both his lines, and Vercingetorix, disdaining to fly, delivered himself into the power of his conqueror. Had the result been otherwise, it is possible that Caesar might have been driven from Gaul, and the floods of barbarians pouring down over Italy would have anticipated history by five hundred years. The following year (51 B.C.) saw the final pacification of the country. In eight years Caesar had done his work .most thoroughly. Gaul never afterwards attempted to revolt, but remained a rich and contented member of the Roman empire. On no subject-country was impressed more com pletely the language, laws, and civilization of its masters. If it had been possible so gradually to extend the bounds of Roman dominion as to convert dangerous hordes of undis ciplined tribes into contented allies, Caesar shows us how it might have been done. Even the patriotism of an emperor of the French cannot but admit that it was better for his
country that Caesar should conquer than Vercingetorix.Whilst Caesar had been engaged in the conquest of Gaul, the bands which held the triumvirate together had gradually become loosened. The three members of the coalition had met at Lucca in 5G B.C., and had arranged that Caesar s command in Gaul should be continued for another five years ; that Pompeius and Crassus should be elected consuls for 55 B.C.; and that on the expiration of their office Crassus should have Syria for his province and Pompeius the two Spains. These arrangements were carried out, but in September 54 B.C. Julia, the daughter of Caesar and the wife of Pompeius, died. A project for a double alliance of a similar kind was rejected by Pompeius. In 53 B.C. Crassus was slain in Parthia. In 52 B.C. it became clear that Pompeius was asserting his independence, was draw ing nearer to Cato as an ally, and Avas becoming more disposed to act as the champion of the senate. From this time till the outbreak of the civil war, it was more and more evident that a collision between the two great rivals was inevitable, although Caesar did his best to avert the catastrophe. The details of the final quarrel are com plicated and difficult to understand. By the law of Vatinius Caasar s command expired in 54 B.C., by that of Trebonius it was continued till 49 B.C. It is comparatively unimportant Avhether his imperium would determine at the end of February or the end of December in that year. It had been arranged among the triumvirs that Caesar should be consul in 48 B.C. According to strict Roman law he must announce himself personally as a candidate, which he could not do whilst he was still in command of an army. Pompeius had, in 52 B.C., secured to Caesar exemption from the restriction by a tribunician law, but there was some doubt whether this had not been rendered invalid by a subsequent enactment. In the same year it had been decreed that no one should hold a governorship until five years had clasped from his laying down the office of consul or senator. In 51 B.C. the question of appointing a successor to Caesar came before the senate, and it was finally determined that his command should come to an end on the Ides of November, 49 B.C. The object of the senate was that some interval should elapse between Caesar s consulship and proconsulship. Caesar knew that he could not trust himself to the power of his enemies, but he displayed his usual moderation. He gave up the two legions which were demanded from him for tho Parthian war, and by means of Curio, whom he had won over to his side, he proposed to the senate that Pompeius and himself should simultaneously disarm. To the surprise of the aristocratic party the motion was carried. Marcellus refused to accept the decision on the plea that Caesar was bringing his army into Northern Italy. He called on Pompeius to put himself at the head of the legion in Campania, and declare war against the invader. Caesar made one more ineffectual attempt at compromise. The propositions brought by Curio to the new consuls on January 1, 49 B.C., were contemptuously rejected, and Caesar was peremptorily ordered to resign his command. Although he had only one legion with him at Ravenna ho could not hesitate. He crossed the frontier of Italy, and arrived at Ariminum.
B.C., and he was murdered on the Ides of March, 44 B.C. During this space of a little over five years he crushed in every part of Europe the armies of his enemies, and laid deep and strong the foundations of the imperial power of his successors. He spent barely fifteen months of thin time in Rome. He did not now, as his enemies had expected, march at once upon the capital. He observed that a surer way lay open to him of securing the possession of Italy by seizing the central heart of the peninsula, which in ancient as in modern times has held out delusive hopes to patriot people and rebellious kings of taming the proud tyranny of the Tiber city. Here the solitary church of St
Pelino marks the site of Corfinium, once the destined homo