at once paid over by the captor s government to the neutral government for distribution. There is only one case in which a return cargo has been confiscated on the ground that the outward cargo was contraband, with fraudulent papers and fraudulent destination ; the voyage was a long one, to the East Indies. Where a neutral vessel carries despatches to a belligerent, as the ship has become a quasi- servant of the enemy, the captor generally not only seizes the papers but confiscates the ship. Despatches from or to accredited diplomatic agents or consuls residing in a neutral country do not fall under this rule, the neutral having an interest in their safe transmission. But ignorance of the contents of despatches addressed to military officials, or unaccredited agents, will not excuse their carriage. Even where the despatches have been received through force or imposition, the English prize court holds that the carrier is liable, because his suspicions ought to have been roused. A very difficult question rose in the American civil war with regard to the searching of mail bags. It the right were renounced absolutely, all belligerent despatches would choosa this safe route. It was arranged that all British mails, certified to be such, should on capture be forwarded unopened. The carriage of persons in the service of a belligerent also leads to confiscation of the ship, if it amount to an intentional assistance of the belligerent. The persons carried may be mere civilians, and the port of destination neutral. The most common case is the carriage of soldiers. The exception to this rule is the case of trans port of diplomatic agents, which is generally recognized as lawful, but which in the Trent affair the United States
Government repudiated.
Besides the works mentioned the following may be consulted : Twiss, On the Rights and Duties of Nations in Time of War ; Phillimore, Commentaries on International Law, iii., where the literature of the subject is fully noticed ; Wheaton s Elements of International Law ; Neutrality Laws Commissioners Rc.port, State Papers, 71, 1871.
CONTRACT is a bargain or agreement enforceable by law. The law of contract occupies so large a space in all civilized systems of law, that only a few of its more leading principles can be conveniently stated here. There is a general harmony in the jurisprudence of modern nations on this subject which is not to be found in other departments of law. The follawing definitions are taken from the Indian Contract Act, 1 872:—
a. "When one person signifies to another his willingness to do or abstain from doing anything with a view to obtaining the assent of that other to such act or abstinence, he is said to make a proposal.
b. When the person to whom the proposal is made signifies his assent thereto, the proposal is said to be accepted. A proposal when accepted becomes a promise.
c. The person making the proposal is called the promiser, the person accepting the proposal the promisee.
d. When at the desire of the promiser, the promisee or any other person has done or abstained from doing, or does or abstains from doing, or promises to do or abstain from doing something, such act or abstinence or promise is called the consideration for the promise.
e. Every promise and every set of promises forming the considera tion for each other is an agreement.
f. Promises which form the consideration or part of the considera tion for each other are called reciprocal promises.
g. An agreement not enforceable by law is said to be void,
h. An agreement enforceable by law is a contract.
i. An agreement which is enforceable by law at the option of one or more of the parties thereto, but not at the option of the other or others, is a voidable contract.
j. A contract which ceases to be enforceable by law becomes void when it ceases to be enforceable.
These definitions, with some changes of expression in the direction of greater precision, are in effect the same as those which are found in English law books. The phrase " void contract," which would be a contradiction in the Indian definitions, is frequently used in English law.
The exchange of proposals and acceptances by correspondence gives rise to some peculiar difficulties. An offer or proposal may be revoked any time before acceptance ; and it is revoked when notice to that effect is given to the promiser. So much is clear and free from difficulty. But when letters containing proposals or acceptances are delayed or misdirected, it is not very easy to say whether there has been a contract or not. When A wrote to B, " I offer you &00 tods of wether fleeces, &c.," " receiving your answer in course of post," but misdirected the letter, which arrived late, and B s answer accepting the offer not arriving at the expected time, A sold the goods to some one else, it was held that as the delay was caused by A s default, it must be taken as against him that the answer did not arrive in course of post (Adams v. Lindsell, 1 B. and Aid. 681). In cases following this some of the judges seem to be inclined to hold that a proposer is bound by an acceptance being posted to him whether it reaches him or not, and others that he is not bound unless he actually receives the accept ance. An acceptance of a proposal must be unqualified, otherwise there is no contract ; the introduction of a new condition by the acceptor, or a reference to something still to be done, prevents the contract from being completed. To constitute a contract the terms must be certain ; e.g., an agreement to take a house, " if it were put into thorough repair, and the drawing-rooms handsomely decorated according to present style," has been rejected as too vague. A contract of course may be concluded by mere conduct, without the exchange of a single word, and multitudes of contracts in small matters of constant occurrence are so concluded. These are called implied contracts a phrase, however, which covers two very different things (1) a real contract which may be inferred as a fact from the conduct of the parties, and (2) a quasi contract, in which the law will treat the parties as if they had made a contract.
Certain classes of persons are under peculiar disabilities in matters of contract, viz., infants, lunatics, and married women. 1, As a general rule at common law contracts made by an infant (a person under twenty-one years) are voidable, unless they are in some way for his benefit, and in particular for " necessaries." By the Infants Belief Act, 1874, contracts for repayment of money lent to infants, or for payment of goods other than " necessaries," are made absolutely void ; and no action can be brought, even if they are ratified after full age and for a new consideration. The question what are necessaries is to be decided by the court and jury on the circumstances of the case, including parti cularly the rank in life of the infant. The protection of infants has been extended by the Court of Chancery to " expectant heirs " as they are called, i.e., persons who borrow money on the credit of their expectations. The principle is a survival from the times when usury was con sidered wrongful, and the preservation of great families a public duty, and is utterly indefensible on any other con siderations. 2. A married woman, being in the eye of the law merged in her husband, cannot bind herself by contract. 3. Contracts made by a lunatic are voidable, except where his state of mind was not known to the other contracting party. The principle is extended to drunken ness. For further information as to such disabilities see under the respective headings. The general rule as to corporations is that they can only make binding contracts under their common seal, excepting in cases of " con venience almost amounting to necessity " (see Corporations).
important, and certainly the most characteristic, of English law is consideration. A consideration is essential to the validity of every contract unless it be made in writing
under seal. The meaning of the word is quite accurately