Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 1.djvu/431

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OOMMEBFOBD V. THOSfPBON. 423 �poration from paying the special depositors, on receiving their certificates of deposit, in the payments of debts due to the institution. How far it is warranted by the principles of eq[uity and conscience in such, its operation upon their right and interests, it is the duty of this court now to examine and declare, and we think that in a court of conscience, at least, but little doubt can be entertained upon the subject, It is an unyielding and inflexible principle of the court of chan- cery that he who seeks equity ought to be prepared to do equity. Before, therefore, the complainant can enlist the countenance of a court of equity in his favor, he must be pre- pared to render to these depositors that full measure of jus- tice which the principles of equity and conscience demand at his hands." �It -was said in Bosley v, Johnson (7 Harris & Johnson, 468) "that there was no case in which a court of equity ever granted a perpetuai injunction to a complainant to protect him in the enjoyment of a naked legal right which he or those under whom he claims have stipulated by deed not to ex- ercise." �Legal rights are to be asserted by legal means, and in such cases courts of equity ne ver lend their aid where justice and equity do not imperatively demand it. �In Kneedler v. Lane, 3 Grant's Cases, 523, an injunction had been issued against the officers of enrolling boards to restrain them from proceeding further with the drafting of Boldiers under the conscription act of March 3, 1863, upon the ground that the act was unconstitutional. In a subse- quent argument of the case the decision was overruled and the act pronounced constitutional, but it was further held that, even if the act had been unconstitutional, the court ought not to have granted an injunction. �In delivering the opinion Mr. Justice Strong observed: "I had no doubt then, and I have none now, that these billa do not present a proper case for the interference of a court of equity by an injunction, even if the act of eongress were unconstitutional. The facts charged exhibit no case for the intervention of a ce nrt of equity. No chancellor ever enjoined ��� �