Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 1.djvu/830

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823 FEDERAL REPORTER. �stance, that of a stock-broker, or a soliciter in a matter fairly within the line of business done by the firm, though the form of the employment, so far as correspondence or personal inter- course with the customer or client is governed, is with one of the partners only, and it is induced by relations of special friendship with or confidence in him, yet it is presumed to be, as a matter of fact, an employment of him as a member of the firm, thus throwing the burden of showing that the employment was really intended to be personal on the firm, if they deny their liability. Willett v. Chambers, Cowp. 814; Devaynes v. Noble ; Clayton's Case, 1 Mer. 675; Baring's Case, 1 Nev. 611; Bc Kebeque v. Barclay, 23 Beav. 107. �These, and other similar cases which might be cited, rest on the basis of a violation' by the firm of a duty assumed by the firm, under an employment made -with, or which, under the circumstances, the firm cannot deny was made with it. They are not, properly, cases of a firm getting into its pos- session the property of another party by the tortious act of one of the partners ; but from the admitted principles of the law of partnership there would seem to be no question that a firm would be liable in trover for the conversion of personal property other than money, or what, by the law merchant, passes for money, under the same circumstances under which an individual would be liable in that form of action. �Each partner being the agent of the firm in the transaction of its businesfs, the firm is liable for the tort of either of its members, if, under the same circumstances, any other principal would be 60 liable ; that is, if the principal bas authorized the particular act, or has adopted it, and taken the benefit of it, or, without special authorization, it was done by the agent in the course of and as part of his employment. The test of liability for trover or conversion of chattels is the unauthorized exercise of such dominion over them as is inconsistent with the rights of the true owner. Bryce v. Buckway, 31 N. Y. 490; Heald v. Carey, 11 C. B. 977; Cobb v, Dows, 10 N. Y. 335; Helbery v. Hatten, 2 H. & C. 822. �That the sale or hypothecating of chattels, without au- thority, is a conversion, is too clear to need authority; and. ��� �