s 84 FEDERAL REPORTER. �Mr. Dobson was by the court of common pleas aforesaid discharged from his trust. The record in bankruptcy is therefore deficient in showing no report from the assignee in bankruptcy. The bankrupts have, however, presented a copy of the auditor's report, Mr. Dobson's accouut, notice published by him, and his petition for dischai-ge and decree thereon, and they are lierewith for- warded. The deflciency is, therefore, substantially supplied.'* �The register, after quoting the provisions of the act of eongress of July 26, 1876, (19 St. at Large, 102,) whioh enacted that the applica- tion might be made "before the final disposition of the cause," pro- ceeded as follows : �" Under the circumstances of the case I tLink the action of the assignee, as before set forth, may be considered as if in the bankruptcy proeeedings, and that within the meaning of the act quoted the application of the bankrupts for their discharge was before the final disposition of the cause." �To this report exceptions were filed by creditors. �E. H. Weil and George Peirce, for exceptants. �William Morris, for bankrupts. �BuTiiEB, D. J. November 26, 1873, Erasmus D, Wolfe and David H, Wolfe were adjudged bankrupts. Janiiary 19, 1874, a meeting of creditors was held and an assignee elected. Four days later the election was approved by the court, and the assignee required to give security in $10,000, as suggested by the register, the deed of assign- ment executed by the register being placed upon file. Here the pro- eeedings terminated. Nothing further was done. The assignee neither gave security as required by the court, nor expressed accept- ance of the trust, as required by the statute. The proceeding, in this incomplete condition, came to an end by abandonment. �A voluntary assignment for the benefit of creditors having been made on the twenty-fourth of October, 1873, the parties turned to it, and pursued the remedies thus afforded, through the instrumentali- ties of the state court. Between the proceeding on this assignment and the proceeding in bankruptcy there is no connection whatever. Finding the remedies afforded by the state court sufficient for their purposes, the parties contemplated no further prosecution of the pro- ceeding here, and permitted it to die by inaction. The petition for discharge, filed four years later, (when creditors were pressing for judgment,) had nothing whatever to rest upon. The attempt thus to revive the defunct proceeding was abortive. There was nothing to revive. The proceeding itself was an abortion, dying in the throes of birth. If it could be regarded as alive, however, the petition would ��� �
