Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 10.djvu/858

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846 PEbEEAL RBPOBTER. �section applies to any oiie other than a person within the category of pei'sons just before eniim'erated ; that is, a person sustaining some relation to the owner that authorizes him to employ the labor or purchase the material in question. �- A mere trespasseror intruder upon the boat of another surely can- not fasten a lien upon it for the value of labor and materials used in unaiithorized repairs thereon; �As was said by this court in The Augusta, 5 Am. L. T. Eep, 495: " A person -who puts work or materials ihto the ship of another as a mere trespasser or intruder, does not thereby become a material-man, entitled to a lien thereon for tho value of such work or materials. But the consent of the owner may be implied from the circumstances of the case. For instance, when the respondent [the owner] con- tracted with Butter to repair the vessel, it was neeessarily implied that he might employ the libellants, and they might be so employed tO' Work thereon. They are, therefore, not intruders or strangers to this tessel, but persons employed to work thereon with the implied consent of the owner. " �It isadmitted by the answer that at the time alleged by the libellants that they- labored on the Gity of Salem she was in the possession of Stetfen under a contract with the respondent to repair her. This being so, he was authorized to employ the libellants to do any work upon her within the scope of his contract. Assuming that the libel- lants Weire employed by Steffen, and did the work on the boat, as they allege, they thereby acquired a lien thereon for the value of their laboi^. Neither is it necessary that they should, at the time of per- forming the labor, have expressed a purpose or oonsciously intended to claim a lien theref or upon the vessel. The law gives the lien upon the performance of the labor as a tneans of securing the payment for it; It is an incident which the law attaches to the, transaction, and can only be waived or discharged by an agreement or understanding to that effect on the part of the person eutitled to it. �These exceptions for impertinence are well taken. It matters not, so far as the claims of the libellants are concerned, what controversy exists betweeu Steffen and his creditors, or how the respondent is involved in it — whether as garnishee or otherwise. If they perf ormed ■ the work on the respondent's boat, as they allege they did, they have a lien thereon for its value, irrespective of the state of the accounts between him and Steffen, and are entitled to maintain this suit to estabMsh their claim, and enforce such lien by the sale of the boat. They are not creditors of the respondent, and the only relation ��� �