- 476 FEDBEAIi REPORTER.
�And so the question of what was the legislative intent in the case of the Oregon statute must be determined mainly upon its own language and circumstances. In this connec- tion weigM must be given to the faot that said section 495 occurs in a code of procedure, and in that division of it which authorizes and regulates the granting of divorces in and by the courts of the state only, and not in a general statute, de- fining or prescribing the rights of husband and wife, as such, in the lands or property of each other. Although, theu, the statute does say that the prevailing party shall "be entitled in ail cases" to a third of the other's land, yet the question arises, in what ail cases? Is it ail the cases of divorce brought and determined under this code in the courts of Ore- gon, and for the causes therein presoribed and allowed, or does the phrase include ail the cases decided under any code in any country and for any cause ? �In my judgment the statute only comprehends ail the cases provided for in it, and which may be said to arise, or at least be determined under it, and in the courts whose procedure is regulated by it. By the Code, § 266, a judgment "in any action" is authorized to be docketed, whereupon it becomes a lien upon the property of the judgment debtor in the county. The phrase "any action" is quite as comprehensive as ail actions; but can it be supposed for a moment that under the circumstances it ineludes a judgment given in any other state or country, or that any judgment was in the contem- plation of the legislature, other than those authorized and provided for in the code in which the provision occurs ? �It may be admitted that the legislature bas the power to provide that a decree of divorce, pronounced in the courts of another state, shall have the same efïect upon the real estate property of the parties in this state as if given here, or that a judgment given in a foreign forum might be docketed here with the same effect as if given in the courts of the state. �But is not to be inferred that the legislature intended to make any such extraordinary provisions from the bare use of language which is fairly satisfied when confined to domestio decrees and judgments, and only occurs in a code of proced- ����
