because the truck was sold on credit and appellee claims that there are many cases from this Court,[1] and from other jurisdictions,[2] which permit a "credit price", as distinguished from a cash price. The cases cited by appellee sustain the general theory, but even the credit price may be attacked as a cloak for usury.[3]
But the facts in the case at bar disclose that there was never any "credit price" actually stated. We have before us the original Conditional Sales Contract between Hare and Meeks, and it recites:
Which said balance of time price is payable in 21 consecutive equal monthly installments of $68.53 each."
On the reverse side of the original contract, there is the assignment from Meeks to General Contract Purchase Corporation and also an affidavit, duly acknowledged by Hare and Meeks, which, omitting signatures and acknowledgment, reads:
"The undersigned Purchaser and Seller of the within motor vehicle hereby swear and affirm that the
- ↑ Some of our cases so holding are: Brakefield v. Halpern, 55 Ark. 265, 15 S. W. 190; Blake v. Askew, 112 Ark. 514, 166 S. W. 965; and Smith v. Kaufman, 145 Ark. 548, 224 S. W. 978.
- ↑ Cases so holding are collected in Annotations in 48 A. L. R. 1442 and 57 A. L. R. 880. See, also, 55 Am. Jur. 338.
- ↑ Ford v. Hancock, 36 Ark. 248; Grider v. Driver, 46 Ark. 50; Tillar v. Cleveland, 47 Ark. 287, 1 S. W. 516; Ellenbogen v. Griffey, 55 Ark. 268, 18 S. W. 126. See, also, 55 Am. Jur. 341 et seq. and Annotation in 104 A. L. R. 245.
