D. Dismissal of quiet title claim
Ms. Hook questions whether it was proper for the district court to dismiss the quiet title claim on the ground that it was dependent on the other claims that were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction or failure to state a claim. The quiet title claim was brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2410, and she argues that it requires different elements of proof than the claims brought under various provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. But the plain language of the amended complaint expressly and exclusively based the quiet title claim on the other claims, which were set out in sections or "paragraphs" numbered I through VII:
Due to the actions and inactions of the United States described in the foregoing Paragraphs I–VII, a cloud has been placed on the title to the real and personal property owned by Smith and/or Hook, who are entitled to have the title to their real and personal property quieted in accordance with . . . § 2410.
Aplt. App. at 88. As a matter of law and logic, the quiet title claim was no longer viable once the court had determined that dismissal of the claims on which it depended (or from which it arose) was proper. Dismissal of the predicate claims precluded Ms. Hook from establishing any improper clouds on title resulting from the government’s alleged wrongdoing. And absent an ability to establish any such improper clouds, the quiet title claim lacked any supporting allegations, let alone allegations suggesting a "plausible" claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face[,]” which occurs “when the plaintiff pleads factual
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