leaves altogether an open question. He is as little dis-
posed to magnify the pretensions of the prince to
whom he addressed his work, as he is to admit any theory
of the indefeasible prerogative of kingship perrogative indeed, strictly speaking, the king has none, for
the authority which he receives by the act of election is
purely official ; the fountain of justice remains with
the law-giver, the people, whose instrument he is and
to whom he is responsible.[1] He has to interpret the
law, not to make it. So too the officers of the state
derive their commission from the people, albeit the king,
in conformity with law, decides the detail of their appoint
ment, together with the other necessary arrangements of
the executive government. Once establish the principle,
and the consequences are easy to draw. The king’s
power is limited in every possible direction. He has
the eye of the people or of its delegates on all his actions.
may be restrained or even deposed if he overpass
his prescribed bounds ; and even though his conduct
be not amenable to the letter of the law, he is still subject
to the final judgement of the national will.[2] On no side is there any room for despotism; in no point is he absolute.
Such are the conditions which Marsiglio deemed proper for the main object of his speculations, the defence of peace in the civil state, and which occupy the first book of his treatise. But among the six necessary constituents of society which he enumerates from Aristotle, who devote themselves to husbandry and handicraft, to provide its material support, those who defend it from
- ↑ We have, says Marsiglio, to explain the causam effectivam, in- stituentem et determinantem reli- qua officiorum seu partium civi- tatis. Hanc auteni primam dici- mus legislatorem [the synonym with Marsiglio for civium uni- versitas ] ; secundariam vero, quasi instrumentalem seu executivam, dicimus principantem, per autori- tatem huius a legislatore sibi con- cessam, secundum formam sibi traditam ab eodein, legem videlicet, secundum quam semper agere ac disponere debet, quantum potest, actusciviles : Lib. i. 15pp. 175 sq.
- ↑ Siquidem [prineipantis excessus] lege determinates, secundum legem corrigendus ; si vero non, secundum legislatoris sententiam : et lege debet determinari quantum possibile fuerit : Cap. 18 p. 185.
