Page:In the matter of an appeal by Gaye Alexandra Mary Luck.pdf/7

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3.

7 The long line of cases to which Lord Evershed referred was confirmed in Tampion v Anderson[1], a decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council on a petition for special leave to appeal against orders of the Supreme Court of Victoria. In Tampion, the Judicial Committee held that orders staying actions for defamation and misfeasance of office on the ground that they were frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process were interlocutory orders. Lord Kilbrandon, giving the advice of the Judicial Committee, said[2] that "a consistent line of authority" left "no doubt" that such orders were interlocutory. His Lordship said[3] that the "matter is really put beyond doubt" by Hunt[4] and cited the above statement of Lord Evershed. When Tampion was decided, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was the final court of appeal for Australia for matters such as those involved in that case. Consequently, the advice of the Judicial Committee in Tampion was binding on all Australian courts including this Court.

8 Privy Council decisions no longer bind this Court. Moreover, no case in this Court has expressly decided that interlocutory orders include an order dismissing an action because it is frivolous, vexatious, an abuse of process or because it fails to disclose a reasonable cause of action. But a number of cases decided in this Court before and after Tampion are consistent with the view that an order falling within any of these categories is an interlocutory order. In Pye v Renshaw[5], the Court held that an order dismissing a suit if no amendment were made to the statement of claim within 21 days was an interlocutory order. In Hall v Nominal Defendant[6], the Court held that an order refusing an extension of time in which to sue was an interlocutory order. Taylor J referred[7] with evident approval to the rule, established in England, that an order striking out a claim on the ground that it was frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process or that it disclosed no cause of action was interlocutory in nature. In Carr v Finance


  1. (1973) 48 ALJR 11 at 12; 3 ALR 414 at 416.
  2. (1973) 48 ALJR 11 at 12; 3 ALR 414 at 416.
  3. (1973) 48 ALJR 11 at 12; 3 ALR 414 at 417.
  4. [1956] 1 WLR 1326; [1956] 3 All ER 513.
  5. (1951) 84 CLR 58 at 77.
  6. (1966) 117 CLR 423.
  7. (1966) 117 CLR 423 at 440.