e. USS MONTGOMERY and USS VINCENNES were ordered by "GW" to provide assistance to the crash site.
f. USS VINCENNES offered assistance but got no response.
2.Operational Reporting
a. 0719 - VINCENNES reported F-14 splashed.
b. CJTFME initially reported the boat engagement by CJTFME 030710Z Jul 88, OPREP-3P/004. Included was the first indication of an "unknown assumed hostile closing from north."
c. CJTFME updated their OPREP-3/004 with CJTFME 030727Z Jul 88, OPREP-3/004A, confirming kill of an Iranian F-14. Details of altitude, spped, and IFF were provided.
d. CJTFME OPREP 3P/004B 031445Z Jul 88 reported the downing of the probable F-14 and noted that CJTFME had been informed of the fact that IR 655 was overdue at Dubai.
e. VINCENNES OPREP-3 031630Z Jul 88 was readdressed by CJTFME under the same DTG providing a timeline for both surface and air engagement and reconfirming altitude as 7800 feet and descending, speed 445 kts, Mode II, 1100, ID as F-14, and that the aircraft had ignored MAD and IAD warnings. Additionally; TN 4131, Bearing/Range O05T/9NM; Mode III, 6675, course 185T, and CBDR amplifying data was supplied.
IV. OPINIONS
A.GENERAL
1. The USS VINCENNES did not purposely shoot down an Iranian commercial airliner. Rather, it engaged an aircraft the Commanding Officer, USS VINCENNES believed to be hostile and a threat to his ship and to the USS MONTGOMERY (FF 1082).
2. Based on the information used by the CO in making his decision, the short time frame available to him in which to make his decision, aand his personal belief that his ship and the USS MONTGOMERY were being threatened, he acted in a prudent manner.
3. Iran must share the responsibility for the tragedy by hazarding one of their civilian airliners by allowing it to fly a relatively low altitude air route in close proximity to hostilities that had been ongoing for several hours, and where IRGC boats were actively engaged in armed conflict with U.S. Naval vessels.
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