Page:Iran Air Flight 655 investigation.djvu/8

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5. 4. altitude that it could attack VINCENNES within the next 9 miles. On the other hand, the report that the altitude was decreasing could possibly have further confirmed a developing decision to fire. The Commanding Officer testified that it was only one piece of information among many. In this reviewing officer's opinion, it is unlikely that this one piece of information would have settled the issue one way or another given the uncertainties that remained and the extremely short time left.

   (U) The above errors aside, one is driven back to fundamentals. The villains of the piece were 6 significant problems which plagued the Commanding Officer and he could not control or discount:

   • VINCENNES was engaged on the surface against Iranian boats.
   • The "unidentified assumed hostile" contact had taken off from a military airfield.
   • The contact was heading directly at VINCENNES and its range was relentlessly closing.
   • The unknown aircraft radiated no definitive electronic emissions.
   • VINCENNES warnings went unanswered.
   • The compression of time gave him an extremely short decision window.
   • Captain Rogers had every right to suspect that the contact was related to his engagement with the IRGC boats--until proved otherwise. The proof never came.
   (U) Given the time available, the Commanding Officer could hardly meet his obligation to protect his ship and crew and also clear up all of the possible ambiguities. It is not unusual in combat to have to deal with uncertainties and conflicting information. Although it might not seem fair commanding officers do not have the luxury of reconciling all such questions before committing themselves. They have to go with the weight of evidence. These are the realities of combat and the commanding officer, if he is to function effectively, must be given some latitude to deal with them."
6. (U) The investigation also examined the training and watch organization of VINCENNES. Given the conditions existing on 3 July, Captain Rogers and his senior CIC watch personnel acted reasonably. That these officers relied on information from their combat team is not only reasonable--but is an absolute necessity in a pressure-packed environment. Watch teams train as a unit and function as a unit, not as separate individuals. It is impossible in the heat of battle to double check every piece of data being reported. The Commanding Officer and his senior watchstanders must rely on their subordinates. This is not to suggest that VINCENNES personnel performed perfectly in this incident; they did not. As the investigation makes clear, to say there were errors made and lessons learned is not

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