Page:Jews and Judaism (Morris Jastrow).djvu/10

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page has been validated.

8

lations were entirely absent, for man, in his insatiable thirst to fathom the mysteries of existence, has always endeavored to bridge over the gap between the finite and the infinite in some way. Everyone who thinks, tries to solve the problems of life in a manner satisfactory to himself, if not to others. That is an inherent trait in man, and has nothing to do with any particular form of religion. But such speculations in regard to the soul, in regard to good and evil, in regard to a future life, and even in regard to God, have never formed an essential feature of Judaism. It is also true that attempts have been made to formulate a creed in Judaism. The great Maimonides was the first to do it, but neither his nor any other has ever been universally adopted or declared binding upon Jews. If, however, by dogmas we mean certain fundamental principles upon which a religion rests, then it is simply absurd to say that Judaism has no dogmas. No religion can exist without dogmas in this sense. Even irreligion has its dogmas. Atheism, no less than Agnosticism, sets up certain principles, even if they be but negative in their character. What is true is, that Judaism, as a religion, is not dogmatic in its character. It has always laid far more stress upon practice than upon theory; it has always been more a way of living than a theory of life. But it is also theoretical. Its theories, it is true, have their outcome in action, and were never mere speculations, indulged in as a pure abstraction, but they were theories, after all. If we object to the term dogma, let us say principles, tenets, doctrines, or what not? It is of no consequence which word we employ, but what we must not lose sight of is that Judaism, as the term has heretofore been understood, has certain doctrines or principles, or whatever name you may please to employ. It may be difficult to give an exact definition of Judaism in precise terms, but, for all that, it must be something definite. Though one may not know exactly what it stands for, it must stand for something, and cannot be employed promiscuously for anything or everything our fancy or caprice may dictate. I lay stress upon this point, for, simple as it may appear, it is frequently lost sight of, and the loose way in