Page:Legislative History of the AAF and USAF.djvu/16

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�This Page Declassified lAW EO12958 The tendency of high ranking Air Corps officers to give up advocacy of independ~ once or autonomy for the air arm was partly due to a resigned acceptance of the status quo, and partly to a desire to allow time for the GHQ Air Force to prove its merit. Although organizational changes gave the air arm a fair degree of autonomy by 1941, it wa? still under Army and War Department control. There was a general reluctance after the outbreak of World War II to commence any agitation for an in- dependent air force for fear that it might interfere in some way with the current pre- paredness program. ? Between 1935 and 1941 the defects of divided command within the air arm, and of limited control by the commanding offi- cer of the GHQ Air Force over his personnel, led to much controversy within the Air Corps, and caused numerous investigations, which resulted in several minor changes in 2?r Corps organization. It finally became ewdent that such an organization was not in the best interests of the expansion pro- gram, and the Secretary of War in March 1941 directed that steps be taken to place the air arm under one responsible head and to permit a certain necessary degree of autonomy. In conformity w?th the Secretary's in- structions, a plan of reorganization was worked out. This reorganization, as set forth in AR 95-5 of 20 June 1941, created the Army Air Forces (AAF) to coordinate the activities of the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps, the Air Force Combat Com- mand (formerly the GHQ Air Force), and minor units. Direct responsibility for avia- tion matters was vested in the Cluef of the AAF, who was to be assisted in policy formulation by the Air Staff. The Chief of the Air Corps and the Commanding Gen- eral, Air Force Combat Command were un- der the jurisdiction of the Chief of the AAF and had immediate responsibility for serv- ice and combat matters respectivelyJ ? Al- though this reorganization gave a greater degree of autonomy to the air arm, it not solve the basic problems of unity of effort and delineation of responsibilities be- tween the service and combat elements of the air arm. Still another reorgamzatmn of the mr arm was being planned at the t?me of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor 47 In the years nnmediately following the creation of the General Headquarters Air Force in 1935, Congress, too, seemed con- tent with the existing air or?anizatlon. Up ?o i March 1939 onty two bfils proposing a separate department of the air were mire- duced ?n Congress. Neither was reported from committee, and one of these was actu? alIy denounced by the Chief of the Air Corps. Within the same foursyear period only five measures providing for a depart- merit of defense came up--four of these were buried ?n committee and the fifth was voted down m the House of Representatives by an overwhelming majority. There was even less congressional act?wty along these lines in the period from I March 1939 to 19 November 1940. In the seven months following, however, a total of 15 biI?s designed to free the Corps from the control of the War Depart- ment was introduced in' Congress. AI? though none of these proposed measures emerged from committee, their sponsors "plugged" for them at every opportumty. The War Department rerumned firmly opposed to any further major changes in the orgarazational set-up of the air arm. Acting Secretary of War Robert Patterson declared that the existing status was satis- factory, and that at all events [t was dan- gerous to incur the delay and the confusion Incident to reorganization at a time when the U.S. was in danger of being drawn into the holocaust of World War H. Secretary of War Stimson was also opposed to any large-scale organizational changes in the mr arm, ?eeling that the reorganization un. der AR 95-õ gave the air arm reasonable autonomy w[thin the framework of the War Department and constituted a more mod- ern and efficient system of creating air power than an independent air force would provideJ s Although various members of Congress continued to show an interest in an inde- pendent air force and offered relevant measures during the ?ar years, no really THIS PAGE Declassflied lAW EO12958