value in the light it throws on the general esteem in which he then stood. For the consciousness, not merely of an innocent purpose, but of a character above the possibility of rational suspicion, was necessary to make Spinoza's visit to the French headquarters prudent or justifiable; and the authorities of his own country would assuredly never have consented to it had they not felt absolute confidence that the public good would in no way suffer by it.
In 1673 Spinoza received a courteous letter from Professor Fabritius, of Heidelberg, who was commanded by Charles Lewis, the Elector Palatine, to offer him the chair of philosophy at that university. This letter contained the following sentence: "You will have the largest freedom of speech in philosophy, which the prince is confident you will not misuse to disturb the established religion." It seems by no means unlikely that this condition was inserted merely as a matter of form. The elector probably knew the "Tractatus Theologico-Politicus;" and if he seriously meant to impose restrictions, he would have laid down something much more definite. Spinoza, however, answered thus: —
Had it ever been my desire to occupy a chair in any faculty, I could have wished for no other than that which the Most Serene Elector Palatine offers me by your hands: and especially on account of that freedom in philosophy which the prince is pleased to grant, to say nothing of the desire I have long entertained to live under the rule of a prince whose wisdom is the admiration of all men. But since I have never been minded to give public lectures, I cannot persuade myself to accept even this splendid opportunity, though I have given long consideration to it. For I reflect, in the first place, that I must give up philosophical research if I am to find time for teaching a class. I reflect, moreover, that I cannot tell within what bounds I ought to confine that philosophical freedom you mention, in order to escape any charge of attempting to disturb the established religion. Religious dissensions arise not so much from the ardor of men's zeal for religion itself, as from their various dispositions and love of contradiction, which leads them into a habit of decrying and condemning everything, however justly it be said. Of this I have already had experience in my private and solitary life; much more then should I have to fear it after mounting to this honorable condition. You see, therefore, that I am not holding back in the hope of some better post, but for mere love of quietness, which I think I can in some measure secure if I abstain from lecturing in public. Wherefore I heartily beseech you to desire the Most Serene Elector that I may be allowed to consider further of this matter.[1]
In 1674 Spinoza had an amusing discussion with a person whose name is withheld on the existence of ghosts. In his first answer Spinoza gives an exquisite turn of politeness to his incredulity. He was delighted, he says, to get his friend's letter and have news of him.
Some people might think it a bad omen that ghosts should be the occasion of your writing to me; but I find something much better in it when I consider that not only real things, but even trifles of the imagination, may thus do me good service.
The correspondence continues, on Spinoza' s part, in a tone of courteous banter. At last his friend attempts to overpower him with the authority of ancient philosophers. The reply to this last argument has a distinct importance, as showing what were Spinoza's notions about the philosophical systems of Greece.
The authority of Plato, Aristotle, and Socrates has not much weight with me. I should have been surprised, indeed, if you had brought forward Epicurus, Democritus, Lucretius, or any of the supporters of the doctrine of atoms. It is no wonder that those who devised occult qualities, intentional species, substantial forms, and a thousand other fond things, should have imagined ghosts and apparitions, and given ear to old wives to diminish the authority of Democritus, whose fame they so envied that they burnt all his books. If you choose to believe these, how can you deny the miracles of the Virgin and all the saints, recorded by so many renowned philosophers, historians, and theologians, of whom one hundred can be produced for one that has recorded a ghost?[2]
It is obvious that Spinoza's knowledge of Greek philosophy was slight and at second hand; but it is significant that his sympathy, so far as his knowledge went, was all with Democritus and the atomic school. The sort of metaphysic which in our own time is always clamoring against supposed encroachments by physical science would have found no favor in his eyes.
In 1674 he wrote an important letter explaining the difference between his view and Descartes' on free will.
I call a thing free if it exists and acts merely from the necessary laws of its own nature, but constrained if it is determined by something else to exist and act in a certain determinate way. Thus God exists necessarily, and yet freely, because he exists by the
