388 T. LOVEDAY : PERCEPTION OF CHANGE AND DURATION. A word as to those cases where we judge B to be the same as A. These are cases of Eecognition, and they are marked by the feeling of Recognition or Familiarity. But this feeling, though it may be prior to the judgment, can scarcely be the conscious con- dition of it, for it must itself rest upon the same conditions as the judgment. Leaving it aside, then, we find that recognition is ordi- narily easy ; we also find few to maintain that it implies the com- parison of a distinct memory-image a of Aj with the present percept A., ; and so far our general view finds support. But do we in cases of difficult recognition use comparison proper ? It might indeed be asked whether recognition with difficulty is possible, whether, i.e., when we have got below the least noticeable difference we do not necessarily judge ' equal ' or ' the same ' with equal ease. But in simple cases such as sound intensity or tone-pitch, even if we dis- regard the relation to this matter of the ' undecided ' judgments that occur about the difference-threshold, we cannot fail to recognise that the time-interval between A l and A. 2 influences the result greatly, and I should be inclined to say that as the interval in- creases beyond the point of easy recognition the tendency grows to make use of a memory-image of A r Certainly this is so in the complex cases of ordinary life, where, e.g., we recognise a com- parative stranger after some lapse of time. In these cases, of course, the question of what differences are important and unim- portant complicates matters ; but in general it seems that the more uncertain the recognition is, the greater the tendency to use memory-images . 3. With regard to cases like that of a melody, it seems on the whole better to exclude them from the present discussion. Meinong of course gives his position away in saying that " zum Vorstellen einer Melodie das gleichzeitige Vorstellen sammtlicher sic ausmachenden Tone unerliisslich erscheint ". A theory that demands so much as that is too unconscionably importunate. But it is not without reason that Schumann has objected to the use of these very complex examples, with regard to which very different views might be held, none of which would necessarily injure our previous contentions; e.g., the chief importance may be attached to feelings, and even then subsequent differences of opinion are possible. For one tersely and forcibly put view cf. Lipps, Ztschft.f. Psych., etc., xxii., 384. T. LOVEDAY.