Page:NTSB RAR-77-10.pdf/22

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unrealistic for the speed and physical parameters of the Lake-Dan Ryan train. The high-intensity electrical are that was observed and heard by eyewitnesses immediately following the collision indicates a heavy electrical power load. The electrical load of lights, heaters, and other components only does not appear to be heavy enough to produce such an arc.

The motorman said that he operated the train around the Wabash and Lake curve in a normal manner. It is unlikely that an eight-car train that entered the curve at from 8 to 10 mph could coast completely through the curve. Therefore, it is logical to assume that at some point, propulsion power was reapplied to maintain the train's speed. If power was being applied at the time of the impact, it more readily explains the heavy electrical arc that was reported. It also would account more readily for the reaction of the cars following the collision. It is possible that the motorman could have inadvertently applied power instead of the brakes when he first saw the Ravensood train, or he may have struck the cineston with his body when the trains collided.

Some persons were seriously injured as a result of the fall of the cars from the elevated structure. There is no evidence to indicate that the integrity of the cars was compromised. Some persons were ejected through the car windows. The size of the windows may have been a factor in the ejection. This subject has been discussed by the Safety Board in other accident reports and it will not be discussed here.[1]

Interior lights on the Ravenswood train remained on until power was cut off. The interior lights went out in the first three cars of the Lake-Dan Ryan train as soon as they overturned. This is an undesirable situation because darkness tends to generate panic and hysteria in a confused environment. The CTA feels that terminating power to the third rail immediately after an accident is not a good practice because it causes the cars to be dark inside. Adequate emergency lights powered from a car's batteries or from dry cell emergency packs could provide the necessary light and still permit the primary power to shut off. This would eliminate the hazards of the third rail.


  1. "Railroad Accident Report - Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad Company Train No. 10/76 Derailment with Three Fatalities and Numerous Personal Injuries, Franconia, Virginia, January 27, 1970." (NTSB-RAR-71-1)
    "Railroad Accident Report-Penn Central Transportation Company Freight Train Derailment-Passenger Train Collision with Hazardous Material Car, Soundview, Connecticut, October 8, 1970." (NTSB-RAR—72-1)
    "Railroad Accident Report-Derailment of Amtrak Train No.1 While operating on the Illinois Central Railroad Near Salem, Illinois, June 10, 1971." (NTSB-RAR-72-5)