Page:Nietzsche the thinker.djvu/283

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RESPONSIBILITY
267

what happens? The community, the deceived creditor, will make itself paid somehow—of that we may be sure. The immediate injury inflicted is the least thing: aside from this he has broken his word, his word and covenant with the whole, and all the goods and comforts of community life in which he has hitherto shared are now in question. The breaker (Brecher, Verbrecher) is a debtor who not only does not repay the advantages given him, but lays violent hands on his creditor; therefore from now on, as is reasonable, he not only loses all these advantages, but he is made to realize what their value is. The wrath of the injured creditor gives him back to the wild outlaw state from which he had been before protected; it thrusts him forth—and every kind of hostility may now be shown him. "Punishment" is at this stage of civilization a copy (Mimus) of the normal relation to a hated, disarmed, subjugated enemy.[1]

The mores of a community may soften as time goes on and as the community becomes stronger, but the general, underlying idea and basis of rights and duties remains the same. Rights arise when men (individually or as a community) give something, and for this expect a return; duties arise when men receive something, and owe in return. There are then no rights or duties in the abstract, none existing per se—all are conditioned on facts of social relationship, on exchanges and contracts (explicit or implied).[2] It is accordingly a misuse of words to speak of "rights," whether of defense or of aggression, as between independent social groups, or for that matter between individuals who are not socially related, for self-defense or aggression under such circumstances is not in accordance with a contract, but is the simple outcome of natural egoism, the fatality of life itself.[3] With such a view Nietzsche can even say, "We have no right either to existence, or to labor, or even to 'happiness': there is no difference in this respect between the individual man and the lowest worm."[4]

But while rights and duties rest thus immediately on con-

  1. Ibid., II, § 9; cf. The Wanderer etc., § 22.
  2. A right "arises," "happens," much as "truth" does according to the Pragmatist view—justice also (cf. Werke, XI, 143). "There is neither a right by nature, nor a wrong by nature" (The Wanderer etc., § 31).
  3. Will to Power, § 728.
  4. Ibid., § 759.