CHAPTER XXII
CRITICISM OF MORALITY (Cont.). THE "ALTRUISTIC" SENTMENTS[1]
A sense of the gradations of life noted in the last chapter underlies also the discussion of the "altruistic" a sentiments. These sentiments may be said to make up the finer, more inward, more spontaneous part of morality, as contrasted with conceptions such as rights, duties, justice, obligation. b
I
However inconsistently with views expressed in other connections, Nietzsche regards the roots of altruism as lying very deep in man—he even says in one place that more than any other animal, man is originally "altruistic."[2] He seems to look on two factors as co-operating to produce the result. On the one hand, social existence requires it, and, on the other, individuals themselves find compensation for a sense of their unimportance in serving others—mothers their children, slaves their masters, the soldier his commander, even the prince his people, and in general.[3] Pleasure in the group to which one belongs is really older than pleasure in oneself, and the sly, loveless ego that only seeks its own advantage in the advantage of others, is not the origin of the group but its destruction.[4] Altruistic sentiment, however, implies egoism somewhere or to some extent—not as its contrary, but as its complement and condition. If there is service there must be those willing to be served—individuals, or the group (as such); altruistic sentiment cannot be universal and all-controlling. In fact, quite apart from individuals the group or community is almost
- ↑ The substance of this chapter appeared in The Hibbert Journal, October, 1914.
- ↑ Will to Power, § 771.
- ↑ Cf. Ibid., §§ 785; Werke, XII, 104-5, § 209; XIII, 178, § 406. "Schopenhauer as Educator," sect. 6, as to the way in which young men may compensate for their felt imperfection.
- ↑ Zarathustra, I, xv.
