Page:Nietzsche the thinker.djvu/311

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THE "ALTRUISTIC" SENTIMENTS
295

being by ourselves and do not need to be ever roaming about.[1] Even too much reading is to be guarded against, because then we learn to think only by reacting, not spontaneously.[2] The broad objection to a sweeping unegoistic morality is that it easily leads to sins of omission, and just because it has the guise of human friendliness, it seduces the higher, rarer type of man the most.[3] c So strong at this point is Nietzsche's feeling that he is led to the view that the absolute supremacy of altruistic conceptions would be an indication of degeneration—for if all should find the significance of their lives in serving others, it would show that none found value in themselves, did not know how to protect and preserve themselves, had no real self (none worth while), and humanity would be so far on the downward grade.[4] Deficiency in personality revenges itself everywhere. A weakened, thin, obliterated, self-denying person is useful for no good thing—"selflessness" of this type has no value for either heaven or earth.[5]

The egoism thus so strongly preached is, however, regarded for the most part under an ultimately altruistic perspective: it is for the good of others, however dimly or impersonally they may be conceived or far off they may be put. And yet Nietzsche raises a rather daring question: Why is the man better who is useful to others than one who is useful to himself? And the answer comes, that this is true when others are of more value, higher than oneself. But suppose that the contrary is true—that others are of less value: in such a situation, he who serves himself may be better, even if he does so at the expense of others.[6] The reasoning sounds cold-blooded, yet can hardly be gainsaid—and the underlying point of view conducts to important distinctions. The character of selfishness (if we use the opprobrious word, and Nietzsche, in a half-defiant way, sometimes does) much depends upon who it is that is selfish. When he speaks of the "wild waters and storm-floods of selfishness" in Europe in the sixteenth century, he means ordinary, vulgar selfishness—the selfishness of princes and peoples who were grabbing, among other things, for the

  1. Zarathustra, III, xi, § 2.
  2. Ecce Homo, II, § 8.
  3. Beyond Good and Evil, § 221.
  4. Twilight of the Idols, ix, § 35.
  5. Dawn of Day, § 345.
  6. Werke, XIV, 63-4, § 123.