Page:Once a Week Dec 1860 to June 61.pdf/151

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page needs to be proofread.
140
ONCE A WEEK.
[Jan. 26, 1861.

Mr. Buchanan and his advisers—at least those who have remained staunch to him after the secession of the Southern members of his Cabinet—have resolved to drive matters to a decisive issue. They are prepared to abide by the result of a conflict between the North and the South, and to enter upon it at once. Until the first shot is fired, we still cling to the belief that the wiser and cooler heads upon both sides will find some means for averting a collision which in any case must be attended with the most disastrous consequences to both parties concerned. It is difficult to suppose in the present temper of the world that a great Empire or Republic can subsist upon the basis of slavery. In the Brazils, which constitute the great example of the slave system thoroughly in work, the most certain apprehensions of a servile war are constantly entertained. The slaves are rather a hindrance to progress than a cause of it. In the first place, from their numbers, they are dangerous, if they should ever combine for concerted action; and, secondly, the white men cannot be brought to consider labour otherwise than as a degradation, where the negroes constitute the bulk of the labouring population.

We are told that the Southerners indulge in dreams of Mexican conquests, and of an extension of their dominion over the Southern portion of the North American Continent. On the most favourable supposition this would be a work of time, and before the idea could be carried out in practice it seems probable that the white men with their machinery would drive them from the markets of the world. The position of a bankrupt slave empire would not be a very enviable one. On the other hand, it is beyond doubt that the Northern States of the great American Confederation derive much of their prosperity from the South. As merchants, as brokers, as bankers, as holders of railway shares, as ship-owners, their wealth is inseparably bound up with the tranquillity and well-being of the Southern neighbours. If Charleston were bankrupt to-morrow, New York would feel the blow. Is it possible to conceive under such circumstances that men with English blood in their veins, and English brains in their heads, will push to extremity a contest which must end in grievous damage, if not absolute ruin, to the conquerors as well as to the conquered? Here in England we cannot be indifferent spectators of the strife, for it is perfectly appalling to think of what the result would be in our own manufacturing districts if the peace of the North American Confederation should be seriously compromised.

It is not, however, only on the other side of the Atlantic that clouds are hanging heavily on the horizon. No one can cast a glance at the present condition of Europe without considerable apprehension as to what may be the history of the year 1861. The policy of the French Emperor is the great enigma which we must solve at our peril. During the last two months, by prolonging the siege of Gaëta, he has done almost as much harm to the Italian cause, as he formerly did good by driving the Austrians out of Lombardy. It is also certain that he has largely reinforced the army of occupation in the Patrimony of St. Peter; he has caused Civita Vecchia to be fortified in a manner which would inspire a casual observer with the belief that he contemplated the withdrawal of his troops from the Italian soil. For some time past he has abandoned the policy of non-interference—if indeed it can be said with truth that he ever acted upon it. Whatever his intentions may have been, this is the result. The Kingdom of the Two Sicilies remains in a most disturbed condition, and the forces of Northern Italy are consumed in the effort to restore tranquillity. Should the Austrians—emboldened by their very despair—make any serious effort in the ensuing spring to reimpose their yoke upon Italy, Louis Napoleon has so contrived matters that he may make submission to his will in Southern Italy the condition of any assistance he may be disposed to afford in the North. Venetia may be the set off for the realisation of the Idées Napoleonnes in the Pontifical States, and in the Kingdom of Naples, and in Sicily.

The pivot of the situation seems to lie in Hungary, and in the discontented provinces now nominally subject to the rule of the Austrian Emperor. If the discontent is as great as it is stated to be, Francis Joseph will have difficulties enough upon his hands, without courting fresh dangers by an armed invasion of Italy. Again, if the Austrians are unable to try the results of another campaign, the combinations of the French Emperor, if we read them aright, will probably prove false. As he will not be called upon to make any more sacrifices, he will scarcely be able to claim any more compensation. Public opinion in France is very much opposed to the course he has pursued at Gaëta, and the opposition will increase if the French armies are not again involved in the chances of war. When the British Parliament meets, there will, no doubt, be very strong expressions of the view taken in this country upon Italian affairs, and just now it seems that the policy of Louis Napoleon is to live upon good terms with us. After all, much depends upon the course taken by the Italians themselves. If they have good sense, and public spirit enough to avoid discord and provincial jealousies, they may even yet defy the intrigues and policy of France. In Central Italy, during the course of last year, they so conducted themselves as to extort the admiration of Europe. Their independence has been the result. We note with sorrow and vexation that in Naples and Sicily at the present moment, it is not so. The rashness of political zealots at that extremity of the Peninsula, just now threatens the sacred cause of Italian freedom with the most serious dangers.

The idea at Paris is, that the French Emperor still clings to the Programme in which he announced his policy before the Italian campaign. Northern Italy is to be under the dominion of the Sardinian King—Central Italy to be given up to the Grand Duke of Tuscany—the Pope to be reduced to the patrimony of St. Peter, and to be guarded there by French troops—Southern Italy to be restored to the Ex-King of the Two Sicilies, with constitutional guarantees. In short, there is to be an Italian Confederation under the protection of France. The French Emperor does not like the prospect of a rival in the Mediterranean.