Page:Oregon Historical Quarterly vol. 20.pdf/58

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page needs to be proofread.

LESTER BURRELL SHIPPEE

50

on the full right to the Russian line. To McLane, however, Buchanan added that while the President was silent on the right of navigation of the Columbia in his offer, since it would cause endless trouble, he had offered, the free ports as a counterpoise, and he, McLane, might intimate to the British ministers that the United States would not accept anything insist

south of 49, the only possible concession being the exchange of the small cape of Vancouver south of the line for an 38

equivalent.

Two

weeks

after the

American offer was made Pakenham Buchanan as to title,

replied, controverting the assertions of

and then rejecting the proposal as one, in fact, less in value than the earlier offer since the free port on Vancouver could not counterbalance the free navigation of the Columbia. Consequently, acting in accordance with Aberdeen's instructions as he understood them, he closed his communication with 39 these words:

"The undersigned, therefore, trusts that the American plenipotentiary will be prepared to offer some further proposal for the settlement of the Oregon question more consistent with fairness and equity, and with the reasonable expectations of the British Government." This response opened for the American government an opportunity to halt the negotiations and at the same time throw upon the British minister the apparent burden of proving himself in the right. Technically Pakenham might claim, as he did, that the offer, being less than had previously been presented to his government, amounted to no real counterproposal hence the game remained as it had been left by Calhoun with the next move for the United States. The rather peremptory tone of the rejection, on the other hand, could be

taken as "scarcely courteous or respectful" as the President chose to regard it, and the flat rejection of the offer without a reference to the British government was for Polk a sufficient reason to

let

the negotiation rest until the other party desired

38 Buchanan to 39 Polk, Diary,

McLane, July I,

355, 360.

12, Ibid., 27-32.

Nil** Register, 12 Scut, 1846.