Page:Oregon Historical Quarterly volume 11.djvu/92

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86 Opinion of Wm. D. Fenton possible aspect and ponder upon it as long as deliberation and patient attention can throw any new light upon the subject, and never declare a statute void unless the nullity and invalid- ity of the act are placed in their judgment beyond reasonable doubt." This is the language of Chief Justice Shaw, used in the case of Wellington, Petitioner, 16 Pick, 87 : "A reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the legisla- tive action and the act be sustained. This is in part because it is presumed that the members of the legislature have first themselves determined that the act was constitutional and have exercised the legislative power in good faith, but it should be controlled by a like rule when construing a constitution and applying the same to pending legislation." "The courts will never exercise the extraordinary power of declaring an act of the legislature unconstitutional unless there is a plain, palpable and clear conflict between the statute and the constitution." Mr. Chief Justice Bean in Simon v. North- rup, 27 Or. 495. "It is also well settled that contemporaneous and practical construction of a constitutional provision will be given great weight by the courts in construing such provision." Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 31. "And it is also the rule that the proceedings of the con- vention which framed the constitution will be examined with a view to ascertain as near as may be the intention of that body." Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 79. And while these proceedings of such convention are less conclusive of the proper construction of the instrument framed than are legislative proceedings of the proper construction of a statute, in cases of doubt such proceedings afford light as to the intent and meaning of the language used. Our Supreme Court in Eddy v. Kincaid, 28 Or. 556, has recognized the rule that while plain provisions of the constitu- tion cannot be broken down by practical exposition but where for a series of years concurrent legislative exposition of the constitution has existed, the court would not be warranted in