the first incumbent of the above trust, Professor Iverach, of the Free Church College of Aberdeen, delivered before the New York University in April, 1899. They deal with profound themes, the problems of cosmology, personality, religion, agnosticism, idealism, etc., and, as might be expected, are thoroughly orthodox both in spirit and results. Stripped of its rhetorical adornments, the author's argument for Theism rests fundamentally, if we rightly understand it, on an analogy: "from the intelligent action of the self … science obtains the conception of an intelligence which is equal to the ordering of a world" (p. 231). Any other explanation of the world-order is 'scarcely intelligible' (p. 30). This, however, does not, in the opinion of the author, suffice. With much 'rejoicing' over the advancements of natural science and with profusion of 'gratitude' for what our 'worthy friends,' the scientists and philosophers, who lack the theistic insight, have taught us, he believes that, making use of such of the deliverances of science and philosophy as serve our purpose, we should go on until we find a God who will satisfy our needs of religion (p. 258). It appears that religion itself furnishes the 'new and higher synthesis' from the material derived from the sciences and philosophies' (p. 285). The appeal thus would seem to be ultimately to practical considerations and to the heart, but what these are, and what may be their philosophical value, are not discussed.
This is a work on the evolution of law and the social consciousness, written by a practical jurist. It is divided into two parts. The first is historical-critical, containing a discussion of the historical school of jurisprudence, founded by Savigny, and the criticisms to which it has been subjected. According to Savigny, positive law (jus, Recht, droit) is at first always popular law, in the form of custom, supplemented and secured in the course of time by legislation, but based in the last analysis upon the social consciousness. The chief features of this conception are the idea of the evolution of law, and the idea of the social consciousness. Savigny's notion of evolution fails to recognize the value of the new germs of life and progress which this evolution tends to develop. Objection is made also to the indefiniteness of the conception of a collective consciousness, to the tendency to regard it as a separate metaphysical entity, and to the attempt to make it a formal source of law. A special chapter is given to Jhering's modification of the historical theory. Jhering bases the entire social life upon the egoistic impulse. The egoist, he declares, is the product of nature, the moral man the product of society. The sentiment of right does not create law, but law the sentiment of right. Man, however, is not an absolute egoist, as Jhering falsely supposes; he is sociable by nature, not merely so by virtue of social institutions. Jhering's theory fails also to
