in which Mr. Hudson sees such peril to his republic, would even such a public calamity go to prove railways public enemies, or that any and all increase of capitalization was "stock-watering"? Doubtless improper practices will obtain with evil-minded men until the end of time. But if the enormous fortunes aforesaid have been accumulated by watering railway-stocks, then it instantly follows that they have not been accumulated by the management and operation of railways; and thus another of Mr. Hudson's charges falls to the ground. And the facts are within this statement. As a matter of fact these accumulators of mammoth fortunes were operators in Wall Street, who by accident became loaded with a favorite security, or with the debentures or stock of a single corporation, which necessitated (or at least suggested) their identification or assumption of the management, directorship, or presidency of this, that, or the other railway corporation. In not a single case have these fortunes arisen from the earning power of the road itself. If a certain railway corporation increases its stock without proportionately increasing its earning power, then the transaction is properly characterized as "stock-watering." But it does not make all railways enemies of the republic, nor in any way cause them to "dominate" the people who have granted them franchises for transportation purposes. It is from a prevalence of the very spirit which Mr. Hudson's volume, "The Railways and the Republic," labors vigorously and constantly to cultivate in this people, that railway-wrecking and stock-watering ever become possible. If Mr. Hudson honestly desires to make stock-watering impossible, let him advise his constituency to yield the railways such tariffs as they are obliged to demand, thus enabling them to meet their fixed charges and so keep out of the hands of "speculative directors," who will, from private greed, proceed to "water" their stocks. Here is a field wherein Mr. Hudson could write books to his heart's content, from a consistent, public spirited, and even contemporary standpoint, and with the best results. The mere collecting of antique newspaper-clippings is, beyond the passing amusement of the hour, of very small utility, of trifling exemplary value, and certainly of not the slightest assistance whatever in solving the problem of the American railway.
III. Eminent Domain.—Mr. Hudson's definition of this facility of railroad companies is as follows: "To take away the property of A and give it to B for the latter's private use and behoof, provided always that B is a railway corporation" (page 114). Now, actually and practically, the above is a remarkably comprehensive and exact definition, not of eminent domain but of what eminent domain is not, and of what it never can be under any circumstances. Mr. Hudson himself has inadvertently told us what it really is: "Experience shows that no railroad twenty-five miles in length can be built without the resort to the power of the State, for there are always some proprietors who demand an exorbitant price, or altogether refuse to let the railway
