Page:Popular Science Monthly Volume 48.djvu/651

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PRINCIPLES OF TAXATION.
579

Another curious feature of the fiscal policy of Athens was an indirect augmentation of the public revenues, by diminishing the public expenditures by an institution which was essentially one of differential exaction (miscalled taxation), and was known as "liturgies." They consisted in the conferring upon ambitious and wealthy citizens certain honorary public offices to which nothing of salary or compensation was attached, but which entailed large expenditures for the entertainment of the people or defense of the country. The acceptance of these offices was compulsory; parsimony in expenditure on the part of the holder exposed him to public censure; and the institution undoubtedly found favor with the masses as a method of dividing the property or consuming the incomes of the wealthy. The system of liturgies was not, however, peculiar or restricted to the Athenian state. It existed in the Greek cities of Asia Minor, and also to a certain extent in Rome, where the persons accepting the office of ædile, whose business it was to take care of public edifices and superintend public festivals, were expected to appropriate large sums from their private resources for the convenience and amusement of the people. The office of ædile in Rome, which was one of great honor, was thus only made accessible to the very wealthy. But as the office was, however, in the direct line of preferment to some lucrative office in the provinces, the expenditures of its occupant were probably regarded in the light of an investment, from which more than complete remuneration was to be expected in the future. The principle involved in the liturgies would also seem to find recognition and exemplification in modern times, and under a different civilization, but in accordance with the same human nature; as, for example, in Great Britain, which by requiring members of Parliament to serve gratuitously, virtually restricts membership in that body to wealthy citizens; and also in the United States, which, by paying her judges and most of her other great officers of state inconsiderable and inadequate salaries, practically reduces the cost of her Government, and virtually makes merchandise of her honors by entailing a part of the proper expenses of such offices upon every first-class incumbent of them.[1]

The comparatively small expenditures of the Athenian state should also to be considered in connection with their revenue requirements. Thus, Mr. Grote estimates the annual expenditure of Athens, in the time of Pericles, at one thousand talents, or


  1. It will not probably be disputed that the talent and experience which ought to be prerequisite to the holding and proper discharge of the duties of many of the important offices of the Government of the United States—judges, cabinet ministers, foreign ministers, consuls, etc.—will command in private life a much higher compensation or salary than is paid by the state.