Page:S v Makwanyane and Another.djvu/100

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contrary, we set out in a transparent and objective way the foundations of our interpretive choice and make them available for criticism. Section 35 seems to acknowledge the paucity of home-grown judicial precedent upholding human rights, which is not surprising considering the repressive nature of the past legal order. It requires courts to proceed to public international law and foreign case law for guidance in constitutional interpretation, thereby promoting the ideal and internationally accepted values in the cultivation of a human rights jurisprudence for South Africa. However, I am of the view that our own (ideal) indigenous value systems are a premise from which we need to proceed and are not wholly unrelated to our goal of a society based on freedom and equality. This, in my view too, is the relevance of the submissions of Adv. Davids, appearing as amicus curiae on behalf of the Black Advocates Forum, albeit that these submissions were inappropriately presented.

[305]In Dudgeon v United Kingdom (1982) 4 EHRR 149, the European Court of Human Rights, per Walsh J, expressed the view that:

… in a democracy the law cannot afford to ignore the moral consensus of the community. If the law is out of touch with the moral consensus of the community, whether by being either too far below it or too far above it, the law is brought into contempt (at 184).

Although this view was expressed in relation to the legislative process, in as far as courts have to comply with the requirements of Section 35 of the Constitution the approach it embodies is not wholly inapplicable in constitutional adjudication. Enduring values, however, are not the same as fluctuating public opinion. In his argument before the court, the Attorney General submitted that:

… the overwhelming public opinion in favour of the retention of the death sentence is sufficiently well-known to be accepted as the true voice of the South African society. This opinion of the South African public is evidenced by newspaper articles, letters to newspapers, debates in the media and representations to the authorities …

The described sources of public opinion can hardly be regarded as scientific. Yet even if they were, constitutional adjudication is quite different from the legislative process, because the court is not a politically responsible institution[1] to be seized every five years by majoritarian opinion. The values intended to be promoted by Section 35 are not founded on what may well be uninformed or indeed prejudiced public opinion. One of the functions of the court is precisely to ensure that vulnerable minorities are not deprived of their constitutional rights.


  1. See Jesse Choper quoted in Rights and Constitutionalism; The New South African Legal Order; Van Wyk D. et al, Juta, 1994 p. 9. The suggestion is that the judiciary is not wholly removed from the political process, where it plays a supervisory role, restraining the majority will through judicial review.