Page:Southern Historical Society Papers volume 04.djvu/265

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Causes of Lee's Defeat at Gettysburg.
257

was determined to hold the position on Cemetery Hill; in fact, that purpose was manifest from the beginning. I was soon sent for by General Ewell, and on reaching him I found General Lee with him and Rodes in the back porch of a small house north of the town, near the road from Carlisle, when a conference took place, of which I will speak before I am done.

It was now after sunset, and Johnson had arrived and his division was halted near the College, in the northwest of the town adjacent to the Mummasburgh road. It is probable that all of Johnson's brigades were not up, and that some of his men were then moving into position. Of that, however, I have no certain knowledge. In this position he was immediately in rear of Rodes' line, a half mile or more distant from it, and the town, as well as Rodes' and my lines, were between him and the enemy. He could not, therefore, have been advancing upon the enemy when halted at this point, and he did not get on my left until after dark. It is highly probable he was awaiting the result of the conference and the instructions General Lee should give us, or he may have been halted while Lieutenants Turner and Early were ascertaining if the skirmishers we had seen were the enemy's. Johnson was not present at the conference, and I know that when that took place all idea of advancing to the attack of Cemetery Hill that night had been abandoned, for it was apparent to all that the time for that had passed.

I have stated all these facts to show the doubts and difficulties we had to deal with. I was exceedingly anxious for the advance against the heights, and would have made it with my own division, immediately after the enemy was driven through the town, if Smith had come to me with his brigade when sent for, as soon as Gordon's ammunition was replenished. General Smith had been posted so as to protect our left flank, and receiving information, which he credited, that the enemy was advancing on that flank, in the exercise of a discretion necessarily entrusted to him, he did not think it prudent to withdraw, for which he was not censurable. My other two brigades were greatly encumbered with prisoners at the close of the fight, and by the loss already sustained, which was 208, their joint numbers had been reduced below 2,550. Gordon's brigade had sustained a loss of 378, and its strength, therefore, was below 1,700. I here make no allowance