was found. He was found, however, without the aid of cavalry, and when found, though by accident, he furnished us the opportunity to strike him a fatal blow. When Hooker was crossing the Potomac at Edwards' Ferry, it was simply impossible for Stuart to cross that stream between that point and Harper's Ferry, as Hooker was keeping up his communications with that place, and the interval was narrow. Stuart's only alternatives, therefore, were to cross west of the Blue Ridge, at Shepherdstown or Williamsport, or east of Hooker's Crossing. He selected the latter, in accordance with a discretion given him; and it is doubtful whether the former would have enabled him to fulfill General Lee's expectations, as Hooker immediately threw one corps to Knoxville, on the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, a short distance below Harper's Ferry, and three to Middletown, in the Catoctin Valley, while the passes of the South Mountain were seized and guarded, and Buford's division of cavalry moved on that flank. It is difficult, therefore, to pereceive of what more avail in ascertaining and reporting the movements of the Federal army Stuart's cavalry could have been if it had moved on the west of South Mountain, than individual scouts employed for that purpose, while it is very certain that his movement on the other flank greatly perplexed and bewildered the Federal commanders, and compelled them to move slower. It is not improbable, however, that it would have been better for him to hurry on, and not meddle with the wagon-train he captured—but, then the temptation was so great to a poor Confederate.
I will now notice a statement Colonel Taylor has made in reference to the conference General Lee had with Ewell, Rodes, and myself at the close of the 1st day of July. In his memorandum the Colonel says:
"Later General Lee rode over to General Ewell's front, and conferred as to the future movements. He wanted to follow up the success gained; thought that with Johnson's division, then up, General Ewell could go forward at dawn next day. Ewell, Early, and Rodes thought it best to await Longstreet's arrival, and make the main attack on the enemy's left. This was determined on. Longstreet was then about four miles off, with two of his divisions."
The statement about this conference in the paper from the Philadelphia Times is not entirely accurate; but I will not notice
