made until late in the afternoon, and, as a natural consequence, there could not be that co-operation that would have taken place had the attack been promptly made at the time expected. When Johnson, later in the day, attacked the enemy's right flank, and two of my brigades advanced to the crest of Cemetery Hill and got possession of the enemy's batteries, the divisions on my right that were to have co-operated did not move, and the enemy sent reinforcements from the part of the line against which those divisions ought to have advanced, which rendered it necessary for my brigades to retire. I have always thought that, if at the time Johnson's division and my two brigades became engaged the two divisions on my right had advanced promptly, we would have secured a lodgment on Cemetery Hill that would have ensured us the victory.
Again: On the 3d the attack from our right was to have been made at a very early hour by Pickett and the other two divisions of Longstreet's corps, while a simultaneous attack was to have been made from our left. Johnson, heavily reinforced for the purpose, begun the attack from our left at the proper time, but Longstreet again delayed until in the afternoon, and there was once more a failure of co-operation.
In regard to your fourth proposition, that General Lee, after the fight on the 2d, having found Meade's position very strong, ought to have attempted "to turn it by the south, which was its weakest place, by extending his right so as to endanger Meade's communications with Washington," I have this to say: It would have been an exceedingly hazardous movement at best, in which we would have been exposed to attack under great disadvantage, as we would have had to move by flank on, I believe, but one road in the narrow strip of country between South mountain and Meade's position; and there would have been great danger of the capture or destruction of a large part of our trains. Look at the map of the country, if you have one, and recollect that we were on the north and west of Meade's position, which was really between us and Washington. In order to get near enough to Meade's line of com-
