few miles of Richmond, as Grant did subsequently, and by the operations of a siege, slowly, but surely, to compass the downfall of the Confederate capital. The Federal army had been twice beaten in attempting to advance from Fredericksburg. It was not probable that they would try that again, and Lee would probably have soon been forced to the vicinity of Richmond. The question is not whether there were serious objections to crossing the Potomac, but whether these were greater than those to remaining inactive on the Rappahannock.
2d.———thinks Hooker should have been defeated on the southside of the Potomac, before the Confederates crossed that river. This would have been better, of course, had it been practicable; but the Federal General was able to concentrate nearly 100,000 men at Gettysburg, while it retained 36,000 for the defence of Washington, and as many more, under Schenck, with headquarters at Baltimore. Half of these last commands might have been made available in case of necessity, and new levies were being brought in rapidly. How was General Lee, with a force of under 70,000 in his entire department, to defeat Hooker so long as the latter remained in the vicinity of Washington? To wait was to allow him to gather all the strength he wished. The movement northward was never intended as a permanent invasion. One of its objects was to so embarrass the Federal army by threatening not merely one city but several, as to obtain opportunities for partial blows.
3d.———says that the fights of July 2d does not show the same co-ordination which insured to the Confederates success at Gaines' Mill and Chancellorsville. This is entirely true. For some reason, or perhaps from a combination of reasons, the Confederate attacks at Gettysburg on the 2d and 3d days were all halting and partial. The Confederate line was a long one, and the perfect co-operation in the attack needed to prevent Meade, whose line was short, from using the same troops at more than one point, was difficult of attainment.
