consider the Federal position at Gettysburg stronger than many others that army had occupied; and the testimony of Butterfield and others shows that General Meade did not rate it highly. The notion of its great strength has grown up since the battle.
It should not be forgotten that a general battle was not in Lee's design in going into Pennsylvania. He repeatedly stated that in consequence of the absence of Stuart with the cavalry he was unaware of the near proximity of the Federal army, and when Hill reported a large force of infantry in his front on July 1st, did not believe it. It was only the fight of that afternoon that convinced him that Meade was near at hand, and he then deemed it injudicious to decline battle. The Confederates would probably have been successful:
1st. Had Ewell and Hill pushed Howard's broken troops over the top of Cemetery Hill on the first day.
2d. Had Longstreet reached the field earlier on the second day and secured and held "Round Top."
3d. Had Ewell made his attack in the afternoon of the second at same time as Longstreet, instead of later, and then not "piece-meal," so that Early was beaten back before Rodes was ready to support him.
4th. Had Longstreet and Hill attacked early on the third, as was first designed, while Ewell was engaged.
5th. Had Ewell and Hill made one prompt and determined effort in support of Pickett at the proper moment.
Very truly yours,
Memorandum by Colonel Walter H. Taylor, of General Lee's Staff.
———shares the opinion that the Confederate cause was not a lost cause from the beginning, and seeks with great care to find out why it did not succeed.
The solution to this point, in my judgment, is summed up in the simple sentence: Paucity of men and of resources. Other conside-
