Page:Southern Historical Society Papers volume 30.djvu/376

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368 Southern Historical Society Papers.

honest gentleman, patriotic citizen, whose memory we are here to- night to honor and perpetuate.

His epitaph might be written as of one " Who never shirked a duty, evaded an obligation, paltried with the truth, quailed before a danger, nor betrayed a trust."

Commander, through you, I now give to the guardianship of Lee Camp the portrait of General James L. Kemper.

WHY WE FAILED TO WIN.

Inquiry Into the Causes of Confederate Defeat.

In its leading editorial article, February i, 1903, the New Orleans Picayune answers the often-asked question " Why it was that the Southern States were defeated in their struggle for independence?"

It says the people of this generation know that the Southern sol- diers were inferior in numbers, but they likewise know that our armies repeatedly gained victories over greater forces and that our generals were more than equal in skill to those of the enemy's. Then the Picayune proceeds to give a thoughtful answer to the question propounded, presenting some views that have not occurred to all writers on this subject. We quote:

The army rolls show that from the first to the last the forces on the Northern side were two million, eight hundred and sixty thou- sand men, while on the Southern there were about six hundred thousand men, making an odds of more than four to one on the side of the North. But this enormous disparity of numbers did not appall the leaders and soldiers of the South, because they had as- tablished a reputation for tremendous and successful fighting that filled them with confidence.

If disproportion in numbers had been all, there are many reasons to hope, if not to believe with confidence, that the result would have been different. But the most serious features of the situation against the South and in favor of the North were in the fact that the North- ern Government possessed all the military establishments, arms and