Page:Southern Historical Society Papers volume 39.djvu/123

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page needs to be proofread.

Review of " From Manassas to Appomattox." Ill

"After our survey I said : 'We could not call the enemy to position better suited to our plans. All that we have to do is to file round his left, and secure good ground between him and his capital.' This," when said, was thought to be the opinion of my commander as much as my own. I was not a little surprised, therefore, at his impatience, as, striking the air with his closed hand, he said : 'If he is there to-morrow I will attack him.' His desperate mood was painfully evident, and gave rise to se- rious apprehensions."

From the outset, therefore, there was a decided difference of opinion between the commander-in-chief and his subordinate. The former, finding his advanced guard had already won an im- portant success, and that the enemy was not yet concentrated, determined to attack. The latter thought it sounder tactics to turn the Federal left, and to occupy a defensive position which, in his opinion, the enemy would be compelled to assault. Un- doubtedly, although such a maneuver would have given the enemy time to concentrate, and they were stronger by 25,000 men than the Confederates, there is something to be said in favor of General Longstreet's idea. Further discussion, how- ever, on this point would be beside the mark. The fact remains that on the morning of July 2, the Confederates had a fine op- portunity of dealing with their enemy in detail. The attack, however, was deferred until 3 o'clock in the afternoon, by which time nearly the whole of the Federal army had come up. Why was the opportunity lost ?

General Longstreet admits that on the evening of July i, he was aware of Lee's intention to attack the next morning. Without waiting further instructions, he had ordered his own army corps to hasten the march, and two of his divisions and part of his reserve artillery had arrived by sunrise. But he adds that he received no orders to attack until an hour before noon.

We have not the slightest doubt that this account is literally correct. Nevertheless, General Longstreet's explanation of the delay is altogether inadequate. If words mean anything, he