self-government. They would mingle and become one with our people without difficulty. The new States brought by them into the Union would soon be hardly distinguishable from the old in any point of importance. Their accession would make our National household larger, but it would not seriously change its character. It might take place—and, in fact, it should take place only in that way—as a result of a feeling common to both sides that the two countries and peoples naturally belong together in their sympathies as well as their interests. Nor would the union of the two countries excite among us any ambition of further aggrandizement in the same direction, for the acquisition of the Canadian Dominion would give to the United States the whole of the northern part of the continent.
Very unlike would be the situation produced by the acquisition of territory to the south of us. In the first place, it would spring from motives of a different kind—not the feeling of naturally belonging together, but the desire on our part to gain certain commercial advantages; to get possession of the resources of other countries, and by exploiting them to increase our wealth; to occupy certain strategical positions which in case of war might be of importance, and so on. It is evident that if we once are fairly started in the annexation policy for such purposes, the appetite will grow with the eating. There will always be more commercial advantages to be gained, the riches of more countries to be made our own, more strategical positions to be occupied to protect those already in our hands. Not only a taste for more, but interest, the logic of the situation, would push us on and on.
The consequences which inevitably would follow the acquisition of Cuba, which is especially alluring to the annexationist, may serve as an example. Cuba, so they tell us, possesses rich natural resources worth having. It
