banking business and of its history, and especially of its recent experiences, he would know that the banks are not imperiled by the maintenance of the existing standard, but have been and will be imperiled by the danger of a debasement of that standard, for the very simple reason that such a danger causes a feeling of insecurity among depositors, a great many of whom will be anxious to with draw their deposits and to get hold of their money before it depreciates, thus bringing on the greatest danger to a bank—a depositors' run. This is substantially what threatened in 1893, when a grave doubt arose in the public mind whether the Government would be able to maintain the gold standard. We were then within a hair's breadth of a very widespread bankruptcy of the banks, and only the wisest management and the utmost efforts of the clearinghouses prevented it. Nothing will be more apt to bring on such a catastrophe than Mr. Bryan's election; and he will then have the satisfaction of welcoming a goodly number of insolvent banks in the fold of the bankrupts whom he considers the only debtors worthy of the name.
Among the farmers of the West and South there seems to be an impression that the embarrassment of the banks will be of small concern to them. I would advise them well to consider how much the sale of their staple products depends upon the ability of the banks to advance the money for moving the crops. They would do well to remember 1893, when, owing to the crisis of that year, the banking machinery did not work, when the large grain storehouses were suddenly obliged to sell out, and grain prices dropped like lead in water. Do the farmers want to have that experience repeated in a tenfold aggravated form? Then they have only to do that which always disturbs the functions of the banking system more disastrously than anything else—threaten with debasement the existing standard of value. Mr. Bryan's election
