training and travel and was the one most likely to have picked up details of the plot, but he had not been briefed on the operation before hand.
40. Other operatives tended to over-scrutinize Sheikh Mohammed's activities for potential clues to the attack's timing.
41. At some point during Atta's training, Bin Laden decided that Atta would be the "emir" of the hijackers in the U.S., with al-Hazmi serving as Atta's deputy. Bin Laden and Abu Hafs had originally considered [Ramzi Bin al-Shibh] as the "emir," because he had been the leader of the "German Cell" when it arrived in Afghanistan, and also because Bin al-Shibh seemed to have leadership talent and had ties to unknown Islamic brotherhood organizations in the Middle East and/or Europe. Sheikh Mohammed claimed that he played no role in Atta's selection as "emir." Sheikh Mohammed recalled that Atta was a good operative. Atta had extensive exposure to the West, worked hard, and learned quickly. Atta, Bin al-Shibh, and other associates from Germany - Marwan al- Shehhi and Ziad Jarrah - after arriving in Afghanistan had expressed a desire to fight the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, but Bin Laden insisted that they instead proceed as soon as possible to the U.S. Atta first came to Afghanistan in late 1999 and had not been to Afghanistan before that time.
