No. 14-2114, Tenorio v. Pitzer
PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
I would reverse the district court's denial of summary judgment for Officer Pitzer based upon qualified immunity. I see no violation of Russell Tenorio's constitutional rights, let alone one clearly established in our law.
A. General Principles
Qualified immunity “balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). The doctrine "'gives ample room for mistaken judgments' by protecting 'all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.'" Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 343 (1986)). This "accommodation for reasonable error exists because 'officials should not err always on the side of caution' because they fear being sued." Id. (quoting Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 196 (1984)). Qualified immunity exists "to ensure that fear of liability will not 'unduly inhibit officials in the discharge of their duties.'" Camreta v. Green, 563 U.S. 692, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2030 (2011) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987)).
We evaluate Fourth Amendment excessive-force claims under an objectivereasonableness standard, measuring the challenged police conduct from a reasonable officer’s perspective. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989). As the majority notes, "[t]he reasonableness of [an officer’s] actions depends both on whether the officers
