Alitio, J., dissenting
this line, United States v. Black Jack, 508 F. 2d 1179 (CA8 1974), the heart of the court’s analysis was this: "Just as Congress requires 'the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification,' such barriers must also give way in the field of housing." Id., at 1184 (quoting Griggs, supra, at 430–431; citation omitted).
Unlike these lower courts, however, this Court has never interpreted Griggs as imposing a rule that applies to all antidiscrimination statutes. See, e.g., Guardians Assn. v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of New York City, 463 U. S. 582, 607, n. 27 (1983) (holding that Title VI, 42 U. S. C. §2000d et seq., does "not allow compensatory relief in the absence of proof of discriminatory intent"); Sandoval, 532 U. S., at 280 (similar). Indeed, we have never held that Griggs even establishes a rule for all employment discrimination statutes. In Teamsters, the Court rejected "the Griggs rationale" in evaluating a company’s seniority rules. 431 U. S., at 349–350. And because Griggs was focused on a particular problem, the Court had held that its rule does not apply where, as here, the context is different. In Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U. S. 702 (1978), for instance, the Court refused to apply Griggs to pensions under the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U. S. C. §206(d) or Title VII, even if a plan has a "disproportionately heavy impact on male employees." 435 U. S. at 711, n. 20. We explained that "[e]ven a completely neutral practice will inevitably have some disproportionate impact on one group or another. Griggs does not imply, and this Court has never held, that discrimination must always be inferred from such consequences." Ibid.
B
Although the opinion in Griggs did not grapple with the text of the provision at issue, the Court was finally re-
