twentieths of its expenses. If we desert this boundary, and content ourselves with leaving to the states an exclusive power of taxing houses and lands, there would still be a great disproportion between the means and the end; the possession of one-third of the resources of the community to supply, at most, one-tenth of its wants. If any fund could have been selected, and appropriated, equal to and not greater than the object, it would have been inadequate to the discharge of the existing debts of the particular states, and would have left them dependent on the union for a provision for this purpose.
The preceding train of observations will justify the position which has been elsewhere laid down, that "A concurrent jurisdiction in the article of taxation, was the only admissible substitute for an entire subordination, in respect to this branch of power, of state authority to that of the union." Any separation of the objects of revenue that could have been fallen upon, would have amounted to a sacrifice of the great interests of the union to the power of the individual states. The convention thought the concurrent jurisdiction preferable to that subordination; and it is evident that it has at least the merit of reconciling an indefinite constitutional power of taxation in the federal government, with an adequate and independent power in the states to provide for their own necessities. There remain a few other lights, in which this important subject of taxation will claim a further consideration.
No. XXXV.
BY ALEXANDER HAMILTON.
The same subject continued.
Before we proceed to examine any other objections to an indefinite power of taxation in the union, I shall make one general remark; which is, that if the jurisdiction of the national government, in the article of revenue, should be restricted to particular objects, it
